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Abstract
Computers are networked together in order to share the information they store and
process. The internet connects many of these networks together, offering a multitude
of options for communication, productivity and entertainment. It also offers the
opportunity for unscrupulous individuals to contact these networked computers and
attempt to appropriate or destroy the data on them, the computing resources they
provide, and the identity or reputation of the computer user. Measures to secure
networks need to be implemented by network administrators and users to protect
their computing assets.
Firewalls filter information as it flows through a network. This filter can be
implemented in hardware or software and can be used to protect computers from
unwanted access. While software firewalls are considered easier to set up and use,
hardware firewalls are often considered faster and more secure. Absent from the
marketplace is an embedded hardware solution applicable to desktop systems.
Traditional software firewalls use the processor of the computer to filter packets;
this is disadvantageous because the computer can become unusable during a network
attack when the processor is swamped by the firewall process. Traditional hardware
firewalls are usually implemented in a single location, between a private network and
the internet. Depending on the size of the private network, a hardware firewall may
be responsible for filtering the network traffic of hundreds of clients. This not only
makes the required hardware firewall quite expensive, but dedicates those financial
resources to a single point that may fail.
The dynamic silicon firewall project implements a hardware firewall using a soft-
core processor with a custom peripheral designed using a hardware description lan-
guage. Embedding this hardware firewall on each network interface card in a network
would offer many benefits. It would avoid the aforementioned denial of service prob-
lem that software firewalls are susceptible to since the custom peripheral handles the
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filtering of packets. It could also reduce the complexity required to secure a large
private network, and eliminate the problem of a single point of failure. Also, the
dynamic silicon firewall requires little to no administration since the filtering rules
change with the users network activity. The design of the dynamic silicon firewall
incorporates the best features from traditional hardware and software firewalls, while
minimizing or avoiding the negative aspects of each.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter begins by outlining the computer security problems motivating this
research. The research goals are then presented, followed by an outline of the entire
thesis.
1.1 Motivation
This research is motivated by many factors in the realm of home computer security.
It is becoming quite common in developed nations for people to have high-bandwidth
internet connections in their homes, often connected to powerful personal computers.
This combination of computing power and communication capability has become an
inviting target for malicious hackers and programmers. By corrupting or gaining
access to a computer, a malicious programmer may destroy or steal the informa-
tion stored on that computer. Furthermore, they may appropriate the computer
and network resources and use them for their own purposes, denying access to the
legitimate user. Some malicious programmers then use these co-opted computers to
spread worms, viruses and other forms of malicious software, often called malware.
Email spam is sent out from these computers as well, in an effort to make money
through fraudulent means and continue the spread of malware.
Gaining access to one computer system using another computer on a remote
network is not trivial. To formulate a plan of attack requires knowledge of the
victim computer, which operating system (OS) it is running, the services that the
victim is providing to the network, and/or the software installed on that computer.
Also, the underlying technology being used to provide network access to the victim
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computer provides information on how to find and communicate with the victim.
The operating system, software, and network services being used on a computer are
choices left to the computer user. These choices are often made without security in
mind. Users may choose to use an operating system because it comes pre-installed
when they purchase a computer, or because it is the only one compatible with their
favorite software. Similarly, the networking technology being used is a choice the
user must make, though this choice is often determined by the choice of network
service provider, since the home network technology must be compatible with the
service provider’s network technology. This most often results in choices which are
not consciously made by the user, leading to the majority of home computer users
running a Windows R© operating system on their computer, with Ethernet network-
ing technology connecting their computer to a home network or the internet. The
popularity of Windows R© operating systems and the Ethernet networking protocol
has resulted in these technologies being the primary targets of malicious program-
mers. By designing malware for a Windows R© operating system, the programmer
knows that a large number of computers will be vulnerable to it, simply due to the
popularity of the OS. Similarly, software for monitoring Ethernet networks has been
developed which allows malicious hackers to get information from network traffic
regarding which computers are on the network and which services they are using or
providing.
The responsibility to maintain secure computers and networks for the average
home user falls to three entities. First, Microsoft R©, the maker of Windows R©
operating systems, releases security patches to help secure the operating system.
Second, the user’s internet service provider must monitor their networks to mitigate
the spread of malicious software and to look for unusual network traffic that may
be an indicator of a network attack. Finally, a large portion of computer security is
left to the home user. Many commercial software products for home users have been
developed to address the threats presented by the various malicious programs, such
as viruses. In addition to software, there have been consumer hardware security
products developed for computer users at home. The problem which has arisen
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is that many of these consumer products require knowledge, about the underlying
technology being used, to be used effectively. This is knowledge which the average
home user does not possess. The malicious programmers developing security attack
strategies do have this knowledge, and they are using it.
1.2 Research Objective and Thesis Outline
This research explores how an embedded firewall, designed using a hardware descrip-
tion language, may improve upon the positive features and mitigate the negative
aspects of traditional firewall implementations. The main focus is on the method of
implementing a simple yet useful firewall for network users who are naive to the un-
derlying technology and communication protocols involved in computer networking.
This project will build upon and seek to improve upon the limited research done in
the area of embedded hardware firewalls [1, 2].
The fundamentals of network functionality and security are presented in chapter
2. In chapter 3, the components and tools used in the design of embedded systems
are discussed. The hardware design of the dynamic silicon firewall is presented in
chapter 4, while the software components of the design are discussed in chapter 5.
In chapter 6, the testing process and results of the conducted tests are explained. In
chapter 7, the conclusions drawn from this project are presented and the direction
for future work is suggested.
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Chapter 2
Computer Networking
This chapter focusses on the functionality and security vulnerabilities of computer
networks. In order to better understand the way computer networks are attacked
and the ways in which data is vulnerable, the fundamentals of computer networking
are presented. Approaches to keep computer networks secure are also discussed, with
an emphasis on network packet filters.
2.1 Network Models
Computers are networked together so that information can be shared. Networks, such
as the internet, are very complex and made up of multiple communication protocols.
Often, engineers and computer scientists organize the protocols into layers for easier
understanding. Two main models of these layers exist [3], the most widely used are
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) and the Transmission Control Protocol /
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) models. The TCP/IP model focusses on the hardware
involved in computer networking, while the OSI model extends the TCP/IP model to
include the software involved in computer networking. For the purposes of discussion,
the TCP/IP model is more than adequate.
The TCP/IP model consists of five layers: Application, Transport, Network,
Data Link and Physical. The application layer concerns the network software the
end user is using. In the TCP/IP model, examples of the application layer would
include web browsers and instant messaging software. The transport layer involves
the protocols that applications use to communicate with each other. The transport
layer is also the layer where any desired communication reliability is implemented,
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since the network, data link, and physical layers provide no guarantees for success-
ful transmission. Furthermore, flow control is implemented at the transport layer.
Examples of transport layer protocols are the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The network layer is responsible for routing
information from one computer to another. It is also responsible for connecting mul-
tiple networks together. This is accomplished in the internet with the aptly-named
Internet Protocol (IP). The data link layer is where data is encoded into bits for
transmission onto the network medium. The most popular data link layer protocol
used in home networking is the Ethernet protocol. Another example of a data link
layer protocol is the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). The lowest layer in the TCP/IP
network model is the physical layer. The physical layer is the actual medium used
for communication. Examples of networking media are twisted-pair copper wires,
coaxial cable, and optical fiber. Figure 2.1 illustrates a network using the TCP/IP
network model. Data being sent from the PC on the left of the diagram travels down
through the layers of the network model and onto the network. As the data is routed
to its destination it may encounter a number of routers, requiring inspection of the
data contained at the network layer. When the message reaches its final destination,
the PC must go back up through the various layers in the network model to get to
the application data.
2.1.1 Application Layer
Many protocols operate at the application layer since applications often provide a
variety of services. For example, a web browser application could implement not
only the HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTP), used to access web sites, but also
the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) if a user directs the web browser to an FTP server.
Application layer protocols implement the functionality needed for a specific appli-
cation to function, but they abstract the underlying network and rely only on the
transport layer for transmission of data across the network.
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Figure 2.1: Example TCP/IP Modeled Network
2.1.2 Transport Layer
The transport layer takes data from the application layer and passes it to the network
layer. The main protocols that operate at the transport layer are the Transmission
Control Protocol [4] (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol [5] (UDP). The message
passed from the application layer has data prepended to it, this data forms a header
used to implement the transport layer protocols. Essential to all transport layer
protocols are the source and destination port numbers. Port numbers represent a
service running on a host, and they provide a way to differentiate data from multiple
applications running on a single host.
UDP is a simple transport layer protocol. It is made up of only four pieces of data,
each consisting of two bytes, that are prepended to the application layer message.
This UDP header consists of the source and destination ports, as well as the length
and checksum fields. The length field contains the size of the UDP segment, in
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bytes. The checksum field allows the destination host to check if any errors were
introduced during transmission. This does not ensure successful transmission, but it
does allow corrupted data to be discarded. As mentioned, the port numbers allow
the application layer data to be delivered to the proper application running on the
destination host.
TCP is a more complex transport layer protocol, providing reliability and con-
gestion control to the network. The TCP segment structure is shown in figure 2.2.
The source and destination ports remain, as in UDP, but many other header fields
are also required. The sequence and acknowledgement numbers are used to ensure
reliable delivery of data. When a large piece of data is being transferred across a
network, it is broken into pieces. The total data bytes being transferred are counted
and each group of bytes in each TCP segment are given sequence numbers so that the
data can be reconstructed after being delivered out of order. The acknowledgement
number of an outgoing packet is the sequence number for the next byte expected
from an incoming packet. Sending an acknowledgement number means that all data
prior to the specified byte has been received successfully. The other feature that TCP
provides to the network is congestion control. This is a service that benefits the net-
work as a whole. When a network is very busy and saturated with packets, data can
be lost due to packet buffer overflows. TCP provides mechanisms for recognizing
network congestion, and reducing packet flow until the congestion is reduced.
2.1.3 Network Layer
The network layer takes a UDP or TCP segment from the transport layer and sends
it to the data link layer for transmission. As with the transport layer, network layer
protocols are implemented by adding data to the transport layer segment, forming
what is called a network layer datagram. Internet Protocol datagram is an appropri-
ate term when the network layer protocol being used is IP. The Internet Protocol [6]
operates at the network layer and is responsible for the routing of datagrams from
one computer to another across a network.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the IP datagram format. At the heart of the Internet
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Figure 2.2: TCP Segment Structure
Protocol is the Internet Protocol address, or IP address. The IP address is made up
of four bytes that define a specific computer on a network. These four bytes can be
divided into the network and host portions of the IP address. The network portion is
used to identify a group of hosts that all belong to the same network, while the host
portion of the IP address specifies an individual host on a network. The network and
host portions of the IP address are essential in routing, as packets must first reach
the proper destination network before they can reach the proper destination host.
The Address Resolution Protocol [7] (ARP) also operates at the network layer
and is responsible for connecting hardware media access control addresses and IP
addresses. Media access control addresses will be discussed further in the data link
layer section. ARP is an essential service provided by the network layer as it connects
the network IP address with the addresses used at the data link layer.
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Figure 2.3: IP Datagram Structure
2.1.4 Data Link Layer
The Ethernet Protocol [8] operates at the data link layer and defines what signals
to send on the physical layer to allow two computers to communicate. Since its
invention in the 1970s, it has become the dominant networking protocol for local
area networks. An Ethernet network can run over twisted-pair copper wire, coaxial
cable, or optical fiber. It can also run at a variety of speeds: 10Mbps, 100Mbps or
1Gbps. Independent of transmission medium and speed, all Ethernet flavors share a
few characteristics.
All Ethernet variants are unreliable connectionless services. Ethernet is connec-
tionless in that an adapter does not directly contact the adapter with which it wants
to communicate. An Ethernet adapter encapsulates information into a frame of
data, often called a packet, and transmits that onto the transmission medium. All
adapters connected to the medium then receive that frame of information. Ethernet
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is considered unreliable because there is no acknowledgement from the intended re-
cipient of the information as to whether the frame was received without error. This
raises the question of how the intended recipient knows whether a frame is meant
for it, and how it knows the frame is error-free.
Ethernet relies on hardware addresses that are unique to each hardware adapter.
These addresses are often called Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, and they
consist of a unique six-byte identifier. The MAC address of the intended recipient
of an Ethernet frame is included in the frame itself (as is the MAC address of the
transmitting adapter), so adapters can check each packet of information to see if
it is for them. Once an adapter has determined that it is the intended recipient
of a packet, it must check if any errors were introduced during transmission. This
is done with a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Before sending a frame out onto
the transmission medium, an adapter appends four bytes to the end of the frame
which are obtained from a mapping of the other bits in the frame. This allows
receiving adapters to check for errors by performing the same mapping of the data
and comparing the results. If the CRC code calculated by the transmitting adapter
and sent with the frame does not match the CRC code calculated at the receiving
adapter, then it can be concluded that an error occurred during transmission.
Now that the functionality of the Ethernet protocol has been discussed, the Eth-
ernet packet structure can be examined. Figure 2.4 illustrates the fields of an Eth-
ernet packet. The preamble consists of 8 bytes where the first seven bytes consist
of the repeated binary pattern 10101010. The eighth byte is 10101011. Alternating
bit values allow a receiving adapter to synchronize to the clock of the transmitting
adapter, allowing bit positions to be determined. The final byte ends with two high
bits. These bits let the adapter know that the preamble is over. The destination
and source MAC addresses, along with the CRC field allow adapters to recognize
packets that are destined for them and to ensure they have been received without
error. Encapsulated between the MAC addresses and the CRC are the type and
data fields, which make up the information from the network layer. The type field is
a two-byte value that defines the network layer protocol being used, while the data
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Figure 2.4: Ethernet Packet Structure
field contains the information being sent by the network layer.
2.1.5 Physical Layer
As previously mentioned, the physical layer is the lowest layer in the TCP/IP network
model. It represents the physical medium used in communication. This could be
optical fiber, coaxial cable, or twisted-pair copper wire. Twisted-pair copper wire is
widely used in Ethernet networks [3].
2.2 Network Security
There are many reasons for people to connect computers together into a network.
Some examples of internet applications include: banking, where someone may pay
bills or set up investments; entertainment, where people may enjoy multiplayer online
games or streaming media; and sharing information, by sending email or surfing the
world-wide web. To accomplish these tasks, personal information often needs to
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be shared and transmitted over a network. Since personal information can be used
for financial gain, some people try to gather this information and either sell it or
use it to make money. The internet, by connecting different networks together, can
provide a means for unscrupulous people to search for and steal valuable personal
information. Network security measures must be taken to protect this data, ensuring
only authorized individuals can access it.
2.2.1 Common Network Attacks
Computers execute instructions. These instructions can be pre-defined and orga-
nized into computer programs, or software, that tells the computer what to do in
certain circumstances. Unfortunately, the people writing computer software can not
consider all possible circumstances under which a computer may be executing instruc-
tions. These overlooked conditions can leave vulnerabilities which someone may use
to gain unauthorized access to a computer [9]. Software containing overlooked or
unintentional errors can lead to someone gaining remote access to a computer over
the internet, especially if the erroneous software is a networked application. Before
software can be exploited, a remote attacker must first find a target for his attack
and then gain information about the system which the software is running on.
Many attempts at computer intrusion begin with port scanning [10]. Port scan-
ning is the process of sending out packets to either a specific IP address or an IP
address range and attempting to connect to specific UDP or TCP ports. Since most
networked programs accept connections only on specific port numbers, any attempts
to connect that succeed identify both that a host is connected to the network and that
it is running a specific application. Even connection attempts that fail can identify
a host as being connected to the network if the host explicitly denies the connection.
Once an attacker knows a host IP address and some services that are running on
that host, they may begin trying to gain access to the system with usernames and
passwords, or by using any known vulnerabilities in the code of the running network
application.
Another way to gain information from a network is by network sniffing [9]. In
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Ethernet networks, recall that packets are sent to all hosts on the local network and
each Ethernet adapter is trusted to only look at packets destined for themselves.
Unfortunately, it is easy to get an adapter to look at all packets being sent to it,
whether the packets are destined for that adapter or not. This can allow people to
not only gain network information such as IP addresses, but even usernames and
passwords used to access network services. For example, when someone signs into
an email server, the packets that leave their computer with the private username
and password in them are first sent to all hosts on the user’s local network. Anyone
sniffing packets on that local network could then recover the private username and
password. For this reason, some email servers encrypt all data including usernames
and passwords.
Some network attacks are designed to gain information by attempting to trick a
network host into communicating with a different host than was intended. This type
of attack can be implemented in a number of ways, but they all rely on manipulating
the networking protocols. Spoofing network packets is the act of sending packets out
from a host, but changing the IP and/or MAC address to make it appear that the
packets were sent from a host other than the actual sender [9]. This type of attack
usually needs to be used in conjunction with an attack against a specific service or
networked application at one of the higher layers in the network stack. An example
of this type of attack is ARP cache poisoning.
As mentioned earlier, ARP is used to associate IP and MAC addresses. When an
Ethernet adapter wants to transmit packets to a specific host, it needs to know the
MAC address of the destination host. The source host sends out an ARP request,
which is a request for the MAC address associated with the destination IP address.
The ARP reply contains the association of a MAC address with an IP address. Once
the source host has the destination IP and MAC addresses, it can send packets
out onto the network to the destination host. However, when ARP was created,
it was assumed that ARP replies would only come as responses to ARP requests.
Unfortunately, a spoofed ARP reply packet will be accepted by hosts as a response
to a request. A packet could be sent out from a host that associates its own MAC
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address with the IP address of a different host. In this case, all traffic destined for
the second host would be delivered to the first host.
Not all network attacks seek to steal data or services. Some are designed to deny
use of network resources to legitimate users. These types of attack are aptly named
denial of service attacks [9]. There are two main types of denial of service attacks,
those that seek to flood services and those that seek to crash services. Flooding a
service refers to sending so much traffic to a specific host on a specific port that
the host is unable to answer service requests. If enough traffic is sent to a victim
host, it will be overloaded and unable to respond to even authorized service requests.
Crashing a service refers to using vulnerabilities in the way the service software was
written to halt execution of the software. For networking services, this is usually
accomplished by sending packets that are malformed or have invalid data in them
to the victim host [9]. If the service software doesn’t know how to deal with the
malformed packets, it may cause the program to halt execution, which also stops the
service from being available.
2.2.2 Security Strategies
There are many strategies that have been developed to try to prevent the above at-
tacks from succeeding [11]. The simplest, and least effective, is often called “security
through obscurity” and doesn’t implement any security measures at all. Security
through obscurity relies on believing that a host would not be attacked because no
one knows about it or because it is assumed no information of interest is on the host.
Since it is incredibly easy to gain information about hosts on a network, obscurity
doesn’t last long if someone is probing a network for weak points. The idea that a
host is of little interest no longer holds true either, as many attackers will gain access
to unprotected systems and use them to attack more interesting and valuable hosts.
A better, and more widely adopted, security strategy is host security [11]. Host
security means that each individual host on a network has security measures in place
to protect them from attacks. This could include additional hardware or software
added to the host machine that prevents or counters the attacker’s methods. Host
14
security can work well on individual systems, however it can become quite complex
when trying to secure a large network with many connected hosts. Each host requires
individual attention because different hosts will have different software and services
running on them. As discussed, different pieces of software will have different in-
herent vulnerabilities in them. Even if all machines on the network were configured
identically, it could still be very difficult and time-consuming to implement host
security if the number of hosts is large.
A more efficient and effective method is to secure the underlying network [11],
instead of securing individual hosts on the network. This network security strategy is
composed of using: authentication to limit who is allowed to use network resources,
encryption to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining information by sniffing
network packets, and filters that look at network traffic and remove packets that are
malformed or come from untrusted hosts or networks. Filtering network packets as
they travel through the network is considered key to securing the network infrastruc-
ture. Network packet filters are relatively easy to set up and maintain, they scale
to support large networks, and they remain transparent to network users [12]. The
term “firewall” is a common name for a network packet filter being used to restrict
communication between two or more networks.
2.2.3 Packet Filtering
Packet filtering is the process of filtering network traffic based on various rules. By
default, the packet filter can either allow or deny all traffic, meaning the rules specify
conditions under which specific packets are allowed onto the network or are dropped,
respectively. The most secure method is to deny all packets that try to come onto the
network and only allow specific packets to pass when they match certain filter rules.
The filter compares the data in individual packets with a set of rules that defines what
to do when there is a match between a rule and a packet. The data used to define
filtering rules is primarily based on the information used to implement the various
network protocols, such as TCP port numbers, IP addresses or MAC addresses. The
consequences of a rule match are often to drop the matching packet, though it will
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depend on the default filter conditions. For example, a filter could allow all traffic
by default and have rules looking for packets containing matching source MAC or
IP addresses with specific transport layer port numbers. By dropping packets that
match this rule, a network could prevent specific service requests coming from a
specific host. Packet filtering requires a tradeoff between the number of memory
accesses needed to implement the filter and the maximum achievable network transfer
speed [13]. There is some overhead as the filter rules need to be compared to the
network traffic and each memory access takes time to complete. This overhead needs
to be minimized in order to achieve a desired network transmission rate and keep
the network filter transparent to the end users. Several algorithms exist to minimize
this overhead for software-based packet filters, but great speed gains can be made
by selecting fast memory, or by using memory that has been adapted for pattern
matching, to reduce filtering time.
2.3 Content-Addressable Memory
Content-addressable memory (CAM) is similar to random access memory (RAM)
except logic comparison circuitry is associated with each bit of storage. This logic
comparison circuitry serves to compare all data storage locations in memory at the
same time when a search is being conducted. Random access memory associates a
piece of data with an address. When an address is provided to RAM, the data at
that location is returned. To search for a specific piece of data in RAM requires
one to check the data at each address sequentially. This means that the time it
takes to search through RAM is dependent upon the number of addressable loca-
tions. Content-addressable memory, on the other hand, accepts a piece of data as
input and returns the address where that data is located in memory. It searches
all data locations at the same time and can identify the location of the data in one
clock cycle. This makes CAM an excellent tool for pattern matching applications
such as the comparison between internet packet data and pre-defined packet filter
rules [14]. Content-addressable memory has become popular with hardware firewall
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manufacturers because it offers massive parallelism.
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Chapter 3
Embedded Systems
This chapter focusses on the components and design of embedded systems. After
discussing the general components that make up an embedded system and the tools
used to create them, the specific tools and components used in designing the dynamic
silicon firewall embedded system will be presented.
3.1 Embedded System Overview
An embedded system is a computer system that has been designed to perform spe-
cific tasks, in contrast to a personal computer which is designed to perform general
tasks. Also, this specific computer system has been incorporated into a larger system
or product [15]. Many consumer electronics products are embedded systems, such as
digital music players, personal digital assistants, or cellular phones. Since embedded
systems perform specific tasks, the required hardware is customized to the specific
application. By selecting only the hardware needed to perform the required task,
embedded systems efficiently use hardware and are therefore economical. Any soft-
ware that may be running in an embedded system is called firmware [16]. Firmware
would also be customized to the specific task being performed, and to the limited
hardware chosen for the system. The hardware and software in combination are
often referred to as an embedded device.
3.1.1 Embedded System Components
The hardware components that make up an embedded system are chosen depending
on the purpose of the embedded device, but they are drawn from the same types
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of hardware that general computers use [15, 17]. Embedded systems may have a
variety of hardware devices, including: processors, volatile and non-volatile storage,
displays, and other input/output peripherals.
The hardware controlling the entire system may consist of a simple logic cir-
cuit, or it may be more complex, such as a microcontroller or microprocessor. If
a microprocessor is required, then it will likely be executing some sort of firmware.
Volatile or non-volatile memory may be used to store data in the system. This may
be flash-memory for storage of firmware or other non-volatile information, or simple
random access memory used for temporary storage. If user input is required, simple
buttons may suffice, however, some embedded systems use more traditional input
devices such as a keyboard and mouse. In short, embedded computer systems can
draw on hardware available for general computing systems, but are tailored for the
specific task they need to accomplish.
For embedded devices that contain a microprocessor and software, the software
needs to be compiled to run on the specific hardware in the system. This may
be done using cross compilers [16], where the firmware is compiled on a general
purpose computer, then transferred into the embedded system. Some embedded
devices run an embedded operating system that bridges the gap between hardware
and software. These embedded operating systems are also called real-time operating
systems [15, 16], as they can change program execution in real-time, depending on
external inputs. For embedded systems without an operating system, the firmware
needs to include the routines used to access each peripheral being used in the system.
3.2 System on a Programmable Chip
The components used in an embedded system draw from the same types of hardware
as a general computing system, but they are chosen so that the system is efficient and
economical to produce. While many embedded systems will use individual, discretely
packaged components that are combined together on a printed circuit board, there
is another alternative. Many embedded systems are defined in software and imple-
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mented on a programmable logic device (PLD), such as a field-programmable gate
array (FPGA). This type of embedded system is called a system on a programmable
chip (SOPC) [15].
3.2.1 SOPC Design
Systems on a programmable chip contain components that are defined using a hard-
ware description language (HDL) such as VHDL [18] or Verilog [19]. Defining a
system using an HDL offers many benefits. First, components can be designed once
and re-used in different systems. Second, components can be purchased as intellec-
tual property and used in system design. Third, the entire system can be extensively
tested through simulations before a hardware version is put to market. Finally, the
entire system can be tested in hardware on an FPGA and then transferred into an
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) if desired. Also, since the system is
defined with software modules which are then translated into logic on a PLD, any
custom logic that is needed in addition to standard components can be easily added
in a custom software module.
3.2.2 Altera R© SOPC Design Software
The Altera R© corporation specializes in SOPC solutions, including PLDs, associ-
ated software tools and intellectual property software blocks. The primary software
package from Altera R© is the Quartus R© II design software [20]. It contains tools
for all aspects of the design cycle. Designs can be created in block diagram form,
with blocks representing the individual HDL modules. The design as a whole is then
synthesized as each HDL module is compiled. The compiled project is then fitted
to the individual PLD and the result can then be used to program the logic device
being used. Tools for design analysis and verification are also included in Quartus R©
II. Timing requirements and logic functionality can be analyzed through software
simulations or they can be investigated on a PLD as the design operates.
For embedded systems, Quartus R© II also comes with a tool called SOPC Builder
20
[20]. SOPC Builder integrates the various components required for an embedded sys-
tem. Altera R© provides many HDL modules, as commercially available intellectual
property, that work with SOPC Builder. This includes memories, communication
interfaces, and even a configurable soft-core processor. SOPC Builder integrates
the processor, busses and peripherals into a memory-mapped system. Firmware can
then be written for the processor to access and manipulate the peripherals as needed.
Various software libraries and application examples are also provided by Altera R©
for firmware development.
3.3 Dynamic Silicon Firewall Embedded System
The dynamic silicon firewall is an embedded system on a programmable chip. The
decision to implement the design on a PLD allowed the use of pre-written intellec-
tual property components, the ability to test the system using simulation, and the
capability to easily transition the design to an ASIC, if desired. The network filter
was to be designed in hardware as a module of custom logic, which lends itself well
to PLDs and the use of an HDL. As an HDL module, the filter was relatively easy
to test and modify as needed throughout the design cycle.
3.3.1 Dynamic Silicon Firewall Testbed
The dynamic silicon firewall was developed and tested on an FPGA development
kit from Altera R© [21]. This kit includes a number of features and peripherals that
work in conjunction with SOPC Builder and Quartus R© II. The FPGA on the board
is the Stratix R© EP1S25F1020C5 device, a general purpose FPGA featuring 25,660
logic elements, 1,994,576 bits of RAM, 10 digital signal processing blocks and 6 phase
locked loops. The board comes with 33MHz and 100MHz oscillators, though other
clock speeds can be synthesized using HDL modules. The onboard memory includes
256MB of dual data rate RAM and 8MB of flash memory. The hardware board
comes in the form of a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) board supporting
both the 32 and 64 bit PCI bus configurations. There are expansion ports on the
21
Figure 3.1: Altera R© Stratix R© PCI Development Kit
board that support daughter-cards which can be custom made, or purchased from
Altera R©. Various communication interfaces are also included, such as serial, parallel
and Ethernet ports. The hardware board is shown in figure 3.1.
In addition to the hardware, various software components are also used in the
testbed. The firmware being used to test the system is based on an example web
server program from Altera R©. The web server accepts HTTP requests and serves
simple web pages. The dynamic silicon firewall was tested by monitoring which
specific hosts were allowed or denied access to the web server. The web server relies
on another firmware component from Altera R©. The Plugs Ethernet Library [22]
is a set of routines, provided by Altera R©, used to configure Ethernet devices, and
to transmit and receive data packets. Plugs provides the use of the raw Ethernet
protocol at the link layer, ARP and IP at the network layer and both TCP and UDP
at the transport layer. For the example web server application, Ethernet, ARP, IP
and TCP are used from the Plugs library.
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Chapter 4
Silicon Firewall Hardware Components
In this chapter, the hardware design of the dynamic silicon firewall is presented.
The core hardware components of the design: the Ethernet chip, the CAM, the
soft-core processor, and the firewall HDL module are discussed in detail.
4.1 Ethernet Device
The Ethernet chip being used in this design is the LAN91C111 from Standard Mi-
crosystems corporation. It is a mixed-signal analog/digital device that implements
the Ethernet protocol at transmission rates of 10 or 100 Mbps in either half or full
duplex mode. It has 8kB of buffer memory, which is used for both transmission and
reception. The registers used to configure and utilize the MAC implementation on
the chip are mapped into four banks, each bank holding eight of the 16-bit registers.
4.1.1 Configuration
The LAN91C111 is configured by accessing various registers in the device. In this
application, auto-negotiation is enabled so that the Ethernet device can achieve
the highest performance when it is connected to various networks with differing
speeds. Auto-negotiation on the LAN91C111 can result in 10 or 100 Mbps speeds,
in either full or half duplex mode. Three interrupt sources are also enabled during
configuration. Reception and transmission completions are denoted by an interrupt,
as are Ethernet protocol handler (EPH) errors. EPH errors can occur if the physical
medium is disconnected or if a fatal transmission error occurs, such as if collisions
occur or a transmit buffer under-run occurs.
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4.1.2 Transmission
The first step in Ethernet transmission for the LAN91C111 is to allocate a portion
of the onboard 8kB buffer memory to hold the packet being transmitted. The packet
is then loaded into the allocated memory and assigned a packet number, which is
used to enqueue the packet for transmission. Once the packet number has been
enqueued, the packet will be keyed onto the transmission medium, assuming that
transmissions have been enabled. When the transmission is completed, the first
word in the allocated buffer memory is written with a status word. This status word
contains important information on the most recently transmitted Ethernet frame,
noting if an error occurred or if the transmission succeeded. An interrupt occurs
in either case, however the transmission sequence stops in the case of a failure. In
addition, the packet number is reported if a failure occurred, whereas the number
is moved to a completed transmission queue upon success. When handling the
inevitable transmission interrupt, the status word needs to be examined to determine
success or failure. If the transmission succeeded, then acknowledging the interrupt
is all that is needed to remove the completed packet number from the completed
transmission queue, and to continue further transmissions. If the transmission failed,
the type of error can be determined from the status register. To retransmit a failed
packet, the packet number can be re-enqueued for transmission and it will be sent
out again once transmissions have been re-enabled.
4.1.3 Reception
Assuming the LAN91C111 has been enabled to receive packets, the device will first
request a portion of buffer memory to hold an incoming packet. When a packet
arrives on the interface, it is assigned a packet number and the incoming data is
written to the allocated segment of memory. If an overrun of memory occurs, the
packet is dropped and the allocated memory is released. When reception has fin-
ished, the first word in the allocated buffer memory is written with a status word.
This status word contains information on any errors that may have occurred during
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reception, and denotes if the packet was longer or shorter than a standard Ethernet
frame size. A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is performed on the received frame,
and if the result shows that no errors are present in the received data, then the asso-
ciated packet number is written to a reception queue and an interrupt occurs. If the
CRC shows that errors exist in the received data, the packet is dropped, the memory
is freed, and no interrupt occurs. When a reception has successfully occurred, the
data can be retrieved from the reception area of buffer memory by using the packet
numbers in the reception queue. As each packet in the reception queue is processed,
commands to remove the packet number from the reception queue and to release the
allocated buffer memory must be issued.
4.2 Content-Addressable Memory
The content-addressable memory (CAM) used in the dynamic silicon firewall holds
32 32-bit words and was created using dual-port random access memory blocks [23].
Since the system is synthesized on an Altera R© Stratix R© FPGA, the Altera R© alt-
syncram megafunction was used for the dual-port memory blocks. The altsyncram
megafunction supports single and dual-port configurations for both random-access
and read-only memory [24]. Each port of the dual-port RAM is configured indepen-
dently to provide the separate write and read functionalities of the CAM.
4.2.1 CAM Writes
Write operations are performed by storing a one-hot encoded value. For example,
take a 16-byte sized CAM. Each byte would be translated into a 256-bit one-hot
word. With 16 of these one-hot encoded bytes, the total storage needed is 4,096
bits. Each write operation toggles one of these bits. The write port of the dual-port
RAM has a single bit as the data input and 12 bits for the address input. These
12 bits are used to access the 4,096 individual bits. The 12-bit address going to the
RAM is made up of the data and address inputs to the CAM. The CAM data byte
and the four bits used to address the 16 CAM locations are concatenated together
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Figure 4.1: CAM made from dual-port RAM: write functionality
to provide the 12-bit address going to the RAM, with the CAM data byte in the
most significant position. Figure 4.1 illustrates an example write operation for the
16-byte sized CAM. In this example, it is desired that a decimal data value of seven
is written to address number two in the CAM. The concatenation shows that the
address presented to the RAM is 114, meaning a one is written to the 114th bit of
the 4,096-bit storage area. This example will be furthered by looking at the CAM
read functionality.
4.2.2 CAM Reads
The port of the dual-port RAM being used for CAM reads, considering our example
16-byte CAM, has a byte-wide address as input and a 16-bit data output. This
equates the 4,096 bits of storage into 256 words, each 16 bits in length. The 16 bits
of output data represent the 16 storage locations in the CAM. The byte-wide RAM
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Figure 4.2: CAM made from dual-port RAM: read functionality
address is connected to the CAM input data byte. When a CAM search is performed,
the data byte used as input results in a 16-bit one-hot output, effectively searching
all 16 storage locations in the CAM. A value of one at any bit in the output denotes
that the input data byte was previously written to one of the 16 storage locations
in the CAM. Figure 4.2 shows an example read operation, assuming that a data
value of seven was previously written to address number two in the CAM. The input
byte has the value of seven, and the 16-bit output has the value one at the third bit
location. This represents address number two, counting up from zero. Looking back
at the write example, we can see this result comes about because a one was written
to the 114th bit of the 4,096-bit storage area. When this storage area is configured
as 256 16-bit words, the 114th bit is the third bit of the seventh word, representing
a value of seven written to address number two.
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4.3 Nios R© Soft-core Processor
The Nios R© central processing unit (CPU) is a soft-core, pipelined, general purpose,
reduced instruction set microprocessor provided by Altera R© for use in PLDs in
either a 16 or 32-bit architecture form [25]. Both variants use a 16-bit instruction
set, which reduces instruction-memory bandwidth requirements. Since the Nios R©
core is configurable, it is possible to add custom logic directly into the arithmetic logic
unit and to add custom instructions to the Nios R© instruction set. The Nios R© CPU
has a five-stage pipeline with separate data and instruction busses in accordance with
the Harvard computer architecture. Each bus follows the Avalon R© bus specification,
which is an Altera R© bus specified for use with the Quartus R© II and SOPC Builder
design tools. The instruction bus master only reads instructions from memory and
provides them to the CPU for execution, it never writes any information to memory.
It can use an optional cache memory if the instruction memory being used has slow
access speeds. The data bus master is a 16-bit wide bus when the 16-bit Nios R©
architecture is used, and is 32 bits wide for the 32-bit architecture. The data master
is used for three purposes. It reads data from memory when the CPU is executing
a load instruction, it writes data to memory when the CPU is executing a store
instruction, and it reads interrupt vectors from the interrupt vector table when an
interrupt occurs.
Altera R© provides a number of soft-core peripherals for use with the Nios R©
CPU. These peripherals exist as HDL modules which integrate with the Altera R©
design tools and allow rapid development of complete systems, since the peripherals
operate on the Avalon R© bus and come with software drivers for use with Nios R©
software programs. Two Nios R© peripherals are used in the dynamic silicon firewall
project.
4.3.1 Nios R© Peripherals
The timer peripheral is essential, as it provides the dynamic aspect of the project.
A timer is used to determine when the IP addresses, used as filtering rules, should
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be purged so that packets received from those addresses are no longer trusted. The
Nios R© timer peripheral is a simple interval timer that is configured and controlled
through six 16-bit registers [26]. Two of these registers are used to hold the value
of the timer period. Another two of these registers can be used to determine the
current value of the timer while it is running. This leaves two registers for status
information and timer control. The status register simply denotes whether the timer
is currently running or if it has reached the period value stored in the timer period
registers. The control register contains four bits of interest. Two bits are used to
start or stop the timer. The start and stop bits are event driven, not value driven,
meaning the start or stop function occurs when written with a one. Writing a zero
to either bit has no effect. The other two bits in the control register are used to
enable timer interrupts and to determine how the timer reacts at the end of each
period. When the interrupt bit is set to one, the timer will generate an interrupt at
the end of every period. Setting this bit to zero ensures no timer interrupts occur.
The continuous bit, when set to one, causes the timer to reload and restart at the
end of every period. When the continuous bit is zero, the timer reloads, but does
not restart at the end of the period. Use of the start bit is then required to restart
the timer. For the dynamic silicon firewall project, the timer generates an interrupt
every two minutes. It is in the interrupt service routine that the purging of IP
addresses occurs. The timer operates in continuous mode, meaning the timer will
simply continue to generate interrupts every two minutes for the periodic removal of
filtering rules.
The parallel input/output (PIO) peripheral is used to provide a memory-mapped
interface between software running on the Nios R© CPU and user-created logic that
is operating external to the system created using SOPC Builder [26]. The PIO port
can be configured for input-only, output-only, or bi-directional accesses between the
internal Avalon R© bus and external logic. Data reads or writes occur through
register accesses, as does configuration. The PIO can be configured to capture edge
transitions and to generate edge or level-triggered interrupts, if desired. For the
dynamic silicon firewall project, PIO peripherals are used to connect the custom
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Verilog packet filter to the Nios R© CPU.
4.4 Verilog Silicon Firewall Module
The system component that is performing the filtering operation on Ethernet packets
is a finite state machine designed as a custom Verilog module. A state diagram for
this finite state machine is shown in figure 4.3. From this diagram, it can be seen that
there are eight states in total, with a number of labeled transitions. A more detailed
state diagram can be seen in figure 4.4. This diagram includes some state information
regarding the last and next states, as well as what functionality is performed in each
state.
The finite state machine is implemented using nested case statements. In the
outer case statement, each case represents one of the finite states, while the inner
case statement has a case select parameter that is incremented on each system clock
cycle to step through command execution and to determine the next state. This
allows timing requirements to be met for any Ethernet chip instructions, since the
system clock speed will always be known and any instructions being executed in the
inner case statement can be ordered to execute in any multiple of clock cycles so
that the LAN91C111 timing requirements are met.
4.4.1 State Machine Entry
The entry point to the state machine occurs when an interrupt is generated by the
LAN91C111 Ethernet chip. The first state (Wait for Interrupt) simply waits for
a new interrupt to occur, and then transitions to the second state (Read Interrupt
Type). A diagram illustrating the flow of the second state is shown in figure 4.5. The
second state begins by storing specific LAN91C111 registers, so that the Ethernet
chip can be restored to pre-interrupt status after the interrupt has been processed.
The next transition is then determined by finding out the cause of the interrupt,
which may be due to reception, transmission, or errors. Ethernet is an unreliable
transmission protocol, meaning that ensuring successful communication is relegated
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Figure 4.3: State Diagram for Silicon Firewall
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Figure 4.4: Detailed State Diagram for Silicon Firewall
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Figure 4.5: Read Interrupt Type State Diagram
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to the higher levels of the network stack, like the transport layer. Therefore, the
error condition is the easiest to deal with, as it simply requires an acknowledgement
of the interrupt and the restoration of the system to allow future transmissions and
receptions. In this case, the second state transitions to the fifth state (Restore Chip
Status).
4.4.2 Transmit Interrupt State
In the case of a transmission interrupt, the second state (Read Interrupt Type)
transitions to the fourth state (Transmit Interrupt). A diagram of the Transmit
Interrupt state is shown in figure 4.6. The purpose of the fourth state is to obtain
and store the destination IP address from the last successfully transmitted Ethernet
packet. First, the packet number of the last transmitted packet must be read from the
transmission-completed queue and written to the packet number register. This makes
the data of the last transmitted packet available at the transmit area in memory.
After a data pointer is set to the location of the status word of the last transmitted
packet, in transmit memory, a data pre-fetch must occur before reading occurs. Due
to the way the LAN91C111 chip was used by Altera R© on their development board,
this pre-fetch requires a wait period of at least 370ns. This wait period is done in
state seven (Data Pre-fetch), so a state transition to state seven occurs whenever
a data pre-fetch is required. After the wait period has passed, a transition from
the seventh state back to the previous state occurs. Once the data pre-fetch has
occurred, the status word of the last transmitted packet can be read. This status
word determines if the last transmission completed successfully. If it did not, and
some error occurred, then the transmit interrupt is acknowledged and a transition
to state five (Restore Chip Status) occurs. If the transmission succeeded, then the
location of the destination IP address to store needs to be determined. The location
of the IP address is different depending on if the network layer protocol of the packet
in question is IP or ARP. The determination of the Ethertype and the corresponding
IP address location is done in state eight (Read Ethertype). A transition to state
eight occurs after it has been determined that the transmission succeeded, and a
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Figure 4.6: Transmit Interrupt State Diagram
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return to state four occurs after the IP address location has been determined. The
data pointer is then pointed to the IP address location and another pre-fetch occurs.
After this pre-fetch has finished, the destination IP can be read. This IP address is
then tested to see if it is already in the CAM, in which case the previous entry simply
needs to be refreshed. If the IP address is not in the CAM, then it is stored as one
of the 32 CAM words, and the entry is marked as fresh. Entries are marked fresh or
stale to provide the dynamic aspect of the project. A 32-bit RAM is used for this,
where the 32 bits represent the 32 CAM addresses. When an entry in the CAM is
written, the corresponding address in the RAM has its data value set to one. A value
of one represents a fresh entry, while a zero represents a stale entry. Entries are only
marked fresh by the Verilog module, and only marked stale by software running on
the Nios R© CPU. Stale entries are periodically removed from the CAM by software.
After the destination IP has been stored and marked fresh, a transition to state
five occurs, where the Ethernet chip is restored to the enable future receptions or
transmissions, and where the system is restored to an initial state where it is ready
to handle future interrupts.
4.4.3 Receive Interrupt State
In the case of a reception interrupt, the second state transitions to the third state
(Receive Interrupt). A diagram of the Receive Interrupt state is shown in figure 4.7.
The purpose of the third state is to obtain the source IP address from each incoming
packet and to compare that address with those stored in the CAM. When matches
are found between source IP and CAM entries, the packet is accepted. However, if
no matching entry is found, then the packet is dropped from the reception queue.
The first step in obtaining the source IP address is to check the status of the last
received packet. The packet at the top of the reception queue is available at the
receive area in memory. As in the case with transmitted packets, a data pointer is
pointed to the location of the status word in the received packet, after which a data
pre-fetch must occur. This requires a transition to state seven for a wait period,
followed by a transition back to the previous state. Once the pre-fetch has finished,
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Figure 4.7: Receive Interrupt State Diagram
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the status word is read and it is determined if any errors occurred during reception.
If there were any reception errors, the packet needs to be dropped from the reception
queue. This action is performed in state six (Release Packet), requiring a transition
from state three to state six. If no errors occurred, then the Ethertype of the packet
must be read, in order to determine the source IP address location. This occurs as in
the transmit interrupt case. A transition to state eight occurs where the Ethertype is
read and the source IP address location is determined. After that, the data pointer
is pointed to the IP address location, and a transition to state seven occurs for a data
pre-fetch, after which the IP address is read. This source IP address is provided to
the CAM, where a search occurs. If the source IP address is found in the CAM, then
the packet will not be filtered-out, and a transition to state five will occur, where
the Ethernet chip is restored to enable future receptions and transmissions. A flag
is stored, denoting whether any higher level entities waiting for incoming packets
need to be notified that a successfully received packet is waiting to be read. In the
case that the source IP address was not found in the CAM, the packet needs to be
dropped from the reception queue. This means a transition will occur from state
three to state six (Release Packet). A diagram of the Release Packet state can be
seen in figure 4.8. In state six, a command that removes the packet at the top of
the reception queue and releases the associated memory is given to the LAN91C111.
The Ethernet chip is polled to determine when these actions have finished. Once
the remove and release command has finished successfully, a transition to state five
occurs, where the Ethernet chip is restored in order to receive and transmit future
packets, and the system is restored to an initial state where it is ready to handle
future interrupts.
4.4.4 Common States
A few of the system states are common to the way both the receive and transmit
interrupts are handled. As mentioned, the Data Pre-fetch state is required in order to
provide a delay while information is read from the packet memory in the LAN91C111.
This is due to the way the Altera R© daughtercard, containing the LAN91C111 chip,
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Figure 4.8: Release Packet State Diagram
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Figure 4.9: Data Pre-fetch State Diagram
was designed. The Altera R© development board communicates with the Ethernet
daughtercard using an asynchronous bus. For asynchronous bus operation, a pin
named ARDY (Asynchronous Ready) is provided on the Ethernet chip to denote
when valid data has been delivered after a pre-fetch operation. However, there is no
connection between the ARDY pin and the daughtercard in the Altera R© implemen-
tation. The LAN91C111 datasheet says that a minimum wait time of 370ns should
be allowed for the data register to fill, if the ARDY pin is not being used on the
chip [27]. This wait period is done in state seven, where 12 clock cycles pass before
returning to the previous state. However, 13 clock cycles pass in total, because an
additional clock cycle is needed to transition into state seven. Since the system clock
has a 30ns period, a total of 390ns pass each time a data pre-fetch occurs. This state
is illustrated in figure 4.9.
Another commonly used state is the Read Ethertype state. It is in this state that
IP address locations are determined. A diagram showing the Read Ethertype state
is shown in figure 4.10. In the transmit interrupt case, the destination IP address
location is of interest, while in the receive interrupt case, it is the source IP address
location which is of interest. In addition to the differences in source and destination
IP locations, the IP address location is different depending on the network layer
protocol in the packet. The first step in determining the IP address location is to
determine the network layer protocol in question. To do this, the previous state
must be inspected to determine whether the data pointer needs to point into receive
or transmit memory. Once this is determined, the data pointer is set to the location
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of the Ethertype and a data pre-fetch occurs. After the pre-fetch has occurred, the
location of the IP address can be determined to be in one of four locations depending
on if the packet was in receive or transmit memory, and if the Ethertype showed that
the network protocol was either IP or ARP. The final step in this state is to return
to the previous state with the IP address location stored.
Four of the states in the system end by transitioning to state five, Restore Chip.
State five is illustrated in figure 4.11. This state is responsible for restoring the
Ethernet chip to a status where it can transmit or receive future packets, and for
restoring the system to an initial state where it is ready to handle future interrupts.
State five is entered into after errors have been found in received or transmitted
packets, or after an interrupt has been handled by the system. The first action in
this state is to restore the registers that were stored in the Read Interrupt state to
their pre-interrupt values. Next, if the flag was set that marks an incoming packet
as one accepted through the firewall, any higher level entities waiting for incoming
packets must be notified. In our test system, this would mean sending an interrupt to
the Nios R© processor to notify it of a waiting packet. Finally, all flags and variables
used in the Verilog module must be re-initialized so that the system is ready to
handle future Ethernet interrupts. Once this is completed, state five transitions
back to state one, where the system awaits a new interrupt.
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Figure 4.10: Read Ethertype State Diagram
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Figure 4.11: Restore Chip State Diagram
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Chapter 5
Silicon Firewall Software Components
The software components of the dynamic silicon firewall will be discussed in this
chapter. These software modules rely upon example software supplied by Altera R©
corporation. The functionality of this example software will be covered, as well as
the changes made to the example which were required for the dynamic silicon firewall
project.
5.1 Altera R© Plugs Ethernet Library
Altera R© provides software libraries to support network connections when using the
Nios R© soft-core processor. These software libraries are collectively known as the
Plugs Ethernet libraries and they essentially are the TCP/IP stack implementation
for the Nios R© processor. Plugs offer similar functionality to the Nios R© proces-
sor, as traditional network sockets do to an operating system running on a general
purpose computer. The Plugs Ethernet libraries support a number of network proto-
cols, including those with which the dynamic silicon firewall concerns itself, namely
Ethernet, IP and ARP. The Plugs source code is abstracted from the underlying
hardware so that it is compatible with differing Ethernet hardware. A change in
hardware simply requires a change in the underlying hardware drivers relied upon
by Plugs to ensure functionality.
5.1.1 Changes to the Plugs Ethernet Library
The software routines supplied by the Plugs Ethernet libraries can be used by includ-
ing the plugs.h header file in any applications designed for the Nios R© processor. The
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majority of the hardware-abstracted routines, defined in plugs.h, are implemented
in the plugs.c file, while the lower-level hardware driver routines for the LAN91C111
Ethernet chip are implemented in the lan91c111.c file. Due to the way various rou-
tines were implemented by Altera R©, a few changes were required in the plugs.c and
lan91c111.c files to ensure the functionality of the dynamic silicon firewall project.
Since both the silicon firewall module and the Nios R© CPU need to communicate
with the LAN91C111 Ethernet chip, it must be ensured that only one of these entities
are in communication with the chip at any one time. This is handled by forcing the
Nios R© processor to request access to the Ethernet chip before communicating with
it. This request is sent to the silicon firewall, and then the firewall module grants
the request when the Ethernet chip is not being used. The time it takes until a
request is answered will depend on which state the firewall module is in when the
request is made. If the firewall module is in the middle of communication with the
Ethernet chip, the request is not granted until the end of communication. Examples
of this delay are the time it would take the Verilog firewall module to handle an
incoming packet, or the time it takes to store the destination IP address of an
outgoing packet. The silicon firewall module checks for any transmit requests from
the Nios R© processor after each packet is handled, meaning the Nios R© processor will
never be completely prevented from communicating with the Ethernet chip. After
the Nios R© CPU has finished communicating with the LAN91C111 it must notify
the silicon firewall module that it no longer requires access to the Ethernet adapter.
Transmit requests needed to be inserted into the plugs.c file in all places where
chip-specific routines from lan91c111.c were being called. The lan91c111.c routines
are accessed through a structure representing the specific Ethernet adapter functions.
This structure is declared in plugs.c but defined in lan91c111.c. Figure 5.1 shows
the declaration and definition of the ns plugs adapter description structure. As can
be seen, all communication between the hardware-abstracted plugs routines and the
LAN91C111-specific routines go through the adapter description structure and the
8 routines contained therein. Of the 8 routines in the adapter description, only 6 are
called in the plugs.c file. The routines nr lan91c111 dump registers and
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Figure 5.1: Plugs Adapter Description
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Figure 5.2: Plugs Example Routine
nr lan91c111 set promiscuous are never called by any routines in plugs.c.
There are a total of 16 calls in plugs.c to the 6 remaining adapter description
routines, requiring each of these calls to be wrapped by code which requests access to
the Ethernet adapter before being called, and code which notifies the Verilog firewall
that communication has finished after the routine returns. Figure 5.2 illustrates an
example routine from plugs.c named nr plugs set mac led which is simply used to
turn the media access control activity light-emitting diode on or off. This simple
routine calls another routine from lan91c111.c, requiring a transmit request before
the set led proc routine is called, and a notification that communication has finished
after the set led proc routine returns.
In addition to the changes made in plugs.c, some modifications were needed in
lan91c111.c. As previously stated, lan91c111.c contains the software routines that are
specific to the actual hardware Ethernet adapter being used. Two important changes
were made in this file. Upon receipt of a packet, the routine where received packets
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are read from the on-chip buffer memory was designed to read multiple queued
incoming packets. Without modification, this would mean that once the packet at
the front of the queue had passed through the firewall, all subsequent packets in the
queue would also pass through by default. This is undesirable, since we want to
ensure that each packet came from a trusted IP address for security purposes. A
modification was made so that packets are individually read from the Ethernet buffer
memory, meaning each packet is tested by the firewall before being read by the Nios R©
software. The other modification required for the silicon firewall to function properly
concerns the LAN91C111 interrupts. By default, the Plugs libraries do not enable
transmit interrupts. Transmissions were conducted by queueing the outgoing packet
without monitoring if the transmission was successful. This is acceptable in the
sense that Ethernet is an unreliable protocol, where any communication reliability
is left to higher level protocols such as TCP. However, the silicon firewall project
depends on knowing when packets have been transmitted, so that it can find and
store the destination IP address. Therefore, the transmit interrupt needed to be
added to the interrupt mask used when the LAN91C111 interrupts are enabled during
initialization of the adapter.
5.2 Project Software
In addition to the Plugs Ethernet library, custom software was needed to manage
three aspects of the project. The dynamic aspect of the project was provided by a
software-controlled timer and associated routines. Also, as previously mentioned, the
Plugs libraries were modified to ensure either the Nios R© CPU or the firewall module
is in sole communication with the Ethernet chip. Some custom software routines
were also needed to accomplish this. Finally, for ease of use in the prototype test
system, initialization of the project components was handled in software. Provisions
to provide for these three additional project components are in the file sfw.c and the
associated header, sfw.h.
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5.2.1 Silicon Firewall Routines
To ensure that IP addresses are not trusted forever, a timer is used to periodically
remove them from the trusted list stored in the CAM. For the prototype test system,
a timer interrupt was generated after each two minute period. While the timer is
a hardware component to the system, software handles the IP removal during an
interrupt service routine. The interrupt service routine is installed when the timer
is started and the Plugs software is initialized. When called, the interrupt service
routine cycles through each address in the RAM, checking whether the associated
data is a one or zero. As previously discussed, a one represents a fresh IP address
is stored in the CAM at the same memory address, while a zero represents a stale
entry. For each RAM address containing a one in data, the interrupt service routine
simply re-writes the data with a zero. In this way, IP addresses are marked stale
every minute, on average, using the two minute timer period. For the RAM entries
denoting stale IP addresses, the matching CAM entry is deleted. Therefore, an IP
address is trusted for an average of three minutes from the time an outgoing packet
is sent; an average of one minute until a CAM entry is marked stale, followed by two
full minutes until it is deleted.
Two software routines are used by the Nios R© CPU to keep track of what piece
of hardware is in communication with the LAN91C111 Ethernet chip. The system
was designed so that the Nios R© processor must request Ethernet access from the
silicon firewall. This request and clear to transmit process is accomplished with two
signals between the Nios R© processor and silicon firewall, tx request and tx allowed.
When the Nios R© processor needs to transmit a packet onto the network, it calls
a routine which sets the tx request signal to one. The silicon firewall checks if a
transmit request has been made on the rising edge of every clock cycle that is not
being used to process an Ethernet interrupt. If a transmit request has occurred, then
the silicon firewall sets the tx allowed signal to one, notifying the Nios R© CPU that
it may communicate with the Ethernet chip. In addition to the two signals used
for negotiating access to the Ethernet chip, another signal is used to keep track of
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whether the Nios R© processor or the silicon firewall is in communication. This signal
is called the mode signal. The entire system can also be viewed as being separated
into two modes, hardware mode, where the silicon firewall is in communication with
the LAN91C111, and software mode, where the Nios R© processor is in communica-
tion. The mode signal is set by the Nios R© processor, but monitored by both the
Nios R© processor and the silicon firewall. Two software routines are used by the
Nios R© processor to set and get the value of the mode signal. When the Nios R©
processor successfully requests access to the Ethernet chip, it sets the mode signal
to zero, representing software mode. After communication is over, it returns the
signal to one, representing hardware mode. The silicon firewall module monitors the
mode and only processes packets in hardware mode, when it has exclusive access to
the Ethernet chip. Just as the silicon firewall module checks for pending transmit
requests from the Nios R© processor after each packet is processed, the Nios R© pro-
cessor sets the mode signal back to hardware mode after each transmission. This
way, neither the Nios R© processor nor the silicon firewall could block communication
with the Ethernet chip (and associated external network) forever.
To simplify testing of the silicon firewall project, a number of initialization rou-
tines were added and used in the system. As mentioned, a timer initialization routine
was used to install an interrupt service routine for the periodic removal of IP ad-
dresses from the CAM. In addition, RAM and CAM initialization routines were used
for setting up known states for both the RAM and CAM entries. These were used
in testing various aspects of the project and will be covered again when discussing
the testing and results of the project.
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Chapter 6
Testing and Results
The SignalTap R© [20] embedded logic analyzer and Ethereal R© [28] network ana-
lyzer were used to monitor and test the dynamic silicon firewall. Both pieces of soft-
ware will be introduced, and their functionality explained before the testing method
and results of the project are presented.
6.1 Analytical Software Tools
The SignalTap R© embedded logic analyzer is a software tool provided by Altera R©
corporation for use in debugging a system on a programmable chip created using
the Quartus R© II software. It allows engineers to monitor all signals in the system
in real time during operation. Since the SignalTap R© logic analyzer is a soft-core
tool, multiple instances may be used if desired, each monitoring a different clock
source in the system. Furthermore, it is capable of monitoring up to 1,024 signals
while taking up to 128 thousand samples per signal. SignalTap R© also supports
up to ten trigger levels to denote when the capture of data begins. Since each
SignalTap R© instance resides on the same PLD as the system being monitored, all
of the above features are dependent upon the resources available on the device being
used. Smaller logic devices may not have enough memory to support the full amount
of signals or samples. As samples are taken, the information is stored on the PLD
and then streamed via a communication cable to the Quartus R© II software running
on a computer. Quartus R© II then displays the waveform output for each signal
captured. The sampled data can also be exported in various formats for verification
using other software tools.
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Ethereal R© is an open-source software tool used to monitor network traffic. It
can capture packets directly off of an Ethernet network, or open a set of previously
saved network packets, and then display detailed information about the data con-
tained in those packets. It should be noted that Ethereal R© supports a few data link
layer protocols other than Ethernet, but since this project concerns itself solely with
Ethernet, the functionality of Ethereal R© on other networks will not be discussed.
Ethereal R© can dissect 750 higher-level network protocols (application, transport,
etc.), displaying the bytes of the various packet fields in a graphical user interface. It
also has the capability to sort a set of captured packets based on packet fields, such
as TCP ports or the IP addresses. The real-time capture of data off of a functioning
network is accomplished by monitoring all network packets seen by the network in-
terface in the computer on which Ethereal R© is running. This requires the network
adapter to be in promiscuous mode, and that the computer running Ethereal R© is
not on a switched network. Switched networks direct traffic destined for a particular
computer to the specific portion of the network containing the destination. Non-
switched networks send all data packets to each adapter on the network, relying on
each network adapter to determine if the data is destined for itself. Promiscuous
mode allows the adapter to see packets that are not destined for its own particular
MAC address. Therefore, a combination of a non-switched network and a promiscu-
ous mode adapter is needed to monitor all traffic on a network.
6.2 Testing Method
To test the functionality of the dynamic silicon firewall, a real-world situation (some
application layer protocol) needed to be chosen. Web browsing was chosen because
Altera R© provides a sample web server application for the Nios R© processor, and be-
cause the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a simple application layer protocol
which is extensively used by most people who have internet access.
A local area network (LAN) was set up, containing the Stratix R© development
board and multiple computers. The web server application was set up to run on
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the Nios R© processor, serving HTTP requests to the computers on the network.
The dynamic silicon firewall was used to protect the web server’s Ethernet interface
from unwanted access. As previously mentioned, software routines were used during
initialization to specify some IP addresses granted initial access, since the dynamic
silicon firewall only accepts incoming packets from IP addresses to which packets
have previously been transmitted. Due to the dynamic aspect of the project, the IP
addresses written to the CAM during start up are trusted for an average of three
minutes unless communication during this period continues.
To test basic functionality, computers on the LAN attempted to access the web
server running on the development board, while the Ethernet traffic was monitored
using Ethereal R©. In this way, it could be seen if the computers whose IP addresses
were entered into the CAM during initialization received access, as they should, while
checking whether all requests from other computers were ignored. The dynamic
aspect of the project could also be tested using this set up, by checking whether
continued communication between the web server and trusted computers resulted in
continued access. Finally, sending another HTTP request after a period of inactivity,
and monitoring the network traffic, allowed verification of the IP removal from the
trusted list stored in the CAM.
Running the above tests while monitoring on-chip operation using SignalTap R©
provided a means for verification of timing requirements and state machine opera-
tion. SignalTap R© triggers could be set up for each state of the finite state machine,
allowing the capture and verification of signals between the Nios R© processor, dy-
namic silicon firewall HDL module and the LAN91C111 Ethernet chip.
6.3 Results
The basic tests of functionality showed that the dynamic silicon firewall operated
as intended. Using the testing method described above, it was seen that the IP
addresses entered into the CAM during initialization were trusted as intended. The
Ethernet packets transferred between a trusted host and the Stratix R© development
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Figure 6.1: Host Communication Succeeding
board were captured using Ethereal R© and are presented as an example in figure 6.1.
In the example shown, the host computer has an IP address of 192.168.129.58, while
the development board has the IP address 192.168.129.126, which can be translated
to the domain name dhcp6.sask.trlabs.ca. The first packet sent from the host is an
ARP request, because the host needs to know the MAC address of the development
board for communication to succeed. Since the host is trusted, an ARP reply is sent
out, followed by the expected TCP handshake and HTTP request packets. The web
server has the capability to access and transmit web pages stored in flash memory
on the development board, however, this feature was not utilized due to hardware
problems resulting from the way flash memory was connected to the FPGA on the
development board. A simple hard-coded message is delivered in response to all
web page requests successfully delivered to the development board. This is shown
figure 6.2, which is a screen capture of the web browser running on the trusted host
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Figure 6.2: Host Web Browser Received Message
computer.
As designed, the dynamic silicon firewall prevented untrusted hosts from commu-
nicating with the development board. Also, trusted hosts were purged after a period
of inactivity as expected. Ethernet traffic for the case of a previously trusted host
attempting to contact the development board after a period of inactivity is shown
in figure 6.3. In this case, because the computer making the HTTP request is not
trusted, the dynamic silicon firewall drops the packets containing the ARP request.
All that is seen in the captured packet data are two unanswered ARP requests from
the host. There is no response from the web server, since the packets were dropped,
and thus the host making the web request can not even tell that the development
board is connected to the network. The host web browser sent two ARP requests
before timing out and reporting an error, as seen in the web browser image shown
in figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.3: Host Communication Failing
The SignalTap R© logic analyzer was used to capture a set of signal samples
for each state of the dynamic silicon firewall. These samples were then displayed
in Quartus R© II as a set of waveforms, allowing verification of the operation of
each state. Figure 6.5 shows sample waveforms from the reception interrupt state.
The signals were sampled on the rising edge of the system clock, with each clock
cycle numbered across the top of the image, starting from the initial trigger point.
The command cycle and timing cycle signals show the state of the system, while
the enet Data and enet Address signals show the communication lines between the
dynamic silicon firewall and the Ethernet chip. While testing, additional signals
were captured to show the operation of the CAM in the system, as well as the timer
function and IP address purge.
The SignalTap R© waveform data also offered a way to ensure that all timing
requirements were met in the project. The LAN91C111 data sheet [27] illustrates
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Figure 6.4: Host Web Browser Timed Out
a number of setup and hold times required for use of the chip. These timing re-
quirements are shown in figure 6.6. Since the system clock operates using a 30ns
period, the timing requirements of the Ethernet chip were easily met when signals
were changed once per clock cycle. As an example, for the dynamic silicon firewall
to read information from the LAN91C111 it is required that a register address is
set, then the Ethernet read line must be dropped low, held low for 15ns, after which
the data can be read from the Ethernet chip. Each of these operations are done in
one 30ns clock cycle, satisfying the timing requirements for the LAN91C111 since
the greatest requirement is a hold time of 15ns. The timing for communication with
the Ethernet chip was verified using SignalTap R©, which could show that each of the
LAN91C111 signal lines were changed in compliance with the specifications laid out
in the data sheet. Also discussed in the LAN91C111 data sheet is a wait period of
370ns which is required between the time the pointer register is directed to buffer
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Figure 6.5: SignalTap R© Waveform Data
memory, and when that data can be accessed. Since the system clock period is 30ns,
13 clock cycles were used, resulting in a wait period of 390ns, complying with the
370ns requirement. This wait period for the data pre-fetch is required due to the
fact that the asynchronous ready signal of the LAN91C111 was not available in the
implementation used on the Stratix R© development board, and therefore could not
be monitored by the system to determine when the data pre-fetch finished and valid
data was available.
Finally, it is important that the dynamic silicon firewall does not negatively
impact network transmission speeds in any great way. The LAN91C111 chip is
capable of 100Mbps transfer speeds, and the dynamic silicon firewall project was
designed while keeping in mind that these speeds should not be hampered due to
the firewall processing delay. By counting the number of 30ns clock cycles required
for a transmit or receive interrupt to be processed by the dynamic silicon firewall, it
can be shown that 2.91µs is the maximum amount of time a packet will be delayed
by processing. This is the case for a successfully transmitted packet, though the
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Figure 6.6: LAN91C111 Timing Requirements
case for a received packet from an untrusted source is roughly the same, requiring
2.85µs to process. Three data pre-fetch wait periods of 370ns each are required in
the above two cases, making up about a third of the maximum processing delay. As
previously mentioned, the data pre-fetch delay is constant due to the development
board design, and a reduction could be made using a different hardware design where
the asynchronous ready signal is available to the dynamic silicon firewall. This aspect
of the project will be discussed further in the future work section.
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Chapter 7
Summary, Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis has sought to address some of the network security issues prevalent in
home networking by improving upon network firewall technology. Current firewalls
targeted to the home user often require knowledge regarding the underlying network
communication protocols to set up and manage. Furthermore, they usually do not
have a default setting which works for the majority of home users. The dynamic
silicon firewall was designed to mitigate these two main problems. In this chapter,
a summary of the entire thesis will be presented, followed by the conclusions drawn
from the work, and suggestions on the direction future work should take.
7.1 Summary
This thesis began by offering introductory information on the functionality of com-
puter networking and the communication protocols used every day in home networks.
The problem of network security was then presented by looking at how the majority
of common computer intrusions begin and the security strategies which have been
developed to counter these network attacks. Background on embedded systems, and
system on a programmable chip design was then offered before introducing the dy-
namic silicon firewall project as an embedded system created using system on a chip
design tools.
After the introductory and background information had been presented, chapter
4 began by discussing the core hardware components of the dynamic silicon firewall.
These components consist of the Ethernet controller, the CAM, the Nios R© soft-
core embedded processor, and the Verilog-synthesized firewall module. The rest of
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that chapter discussed the design and functionality of the custom HDL module, de-
scribed as a finite state machine. This illustrated the manner in which information
flows through the system by explaining the interaction between the Nios R© pro-
cessor, the Verilog filter module and the Ethernet controller. Chapter 5 completed
the picture of the entire system by describing the software used in the design. The
software consisted of both custom code, and code which was provided by Altera R©
corporation and modified for use with this design. The custom software components
were given the responsibility of initializing the system and providing the dynamic
aspect to the project. In chapter 6, two software analytical tools were introduced,
followed by a discussion on how these tools could be used to monitor the dynamic
silicon firewall system to prove functionality. The testing method of using the system
to protect a simple web server was presented, followed by the results of monitoring
the testbed.
7.2 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to investigate how an embedded hardware firewall
could improve upon existing firewall technology. Furthermore, the goal was set to
simplify the administration of the firewall for home users who are naive to network
technology, while maintaining the security benefits provided by firewalls.
Test results have shown that the dynamic silicon firewall filters Ethernet network
traffic at the network layer. Administration has been minimized by monitoring the
user’s network activity and basing the filter rules on whom the user chooses to
contact. The ability to dynamically trust selected network hosts for limited periods
of time adds a significant layer of protection from remote network attacks.
An analysis of the processing delay has shown that the dynamic silicon firewall
requires approximately 3µs to filter a network packet. This value is dependent on
the clock speed of the system, which was 33MHz for the system under test. The
3µs value represents a threefold increase in speed over the only previous embedded
hardware firewall found in research, and a hundredfold increase in speed over a
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software firewall run on the Nios R© embedded processor [1]. By increasing the clock
speed, the dynamic silicon firewall should easily scale to network transfer speeds
above the tested 100Mbps link speed.
It should be noted that there is an embedded hardware firewall on the market,
intended for large corporate networks [2]. Unlike the dynamic silicon firewall, the
3Com R© embedded hardware firewall uses filtering rules administered from a central
location. This affords a central point of failure, which would lead to a network-wide
compromise of security if the central computer administrating the filtering rules
was accessed by unauthorized individuals. Also, since the filtering rules are not
determined by user activity, a significant amount of setup is required. However,
since this product is intended for corporations, the setup and maintenance required
would be handled by information technology professionals employed by corporations.
The 3Com R© embedded hardware firewall is protected intellectual property, so no
direct comparisons in performance could me made, and since it is targetted toward a
different audience than the dynamic silicon firewall, it will not be discussed further.
The design of the dynamic silicon firewall required 138kB of memory and 3339
logic elements when synthesized on the development board. This represents a small
amount of resources, 13% of the logic elements and 7% of the memory available
on the Stratix R© EP1S25F1020C5 FPGA. Therefore, if this design were developed
as an ASIC product, it would result in a small device. Also, this design would be
efficiently incorporated into an existing ASIC due to the small size of the dynamic
silicon firewall.
This research has found a number of ways to improve upon existing network secu-
rity technology [29]. This project filters network packets using dedicated hardware.
A host computer protected by the dynamic silicon firewall instead of a software fire-
wall would not experience general performance degradation during stressful network
conditions such as those experienced during a denial of service attack. A software
firewall running on a general purpose computer would be using the host processor’s
resources to filter packets. Secondly, the dynamic silicon firewall is designed to be
in each host on a network, so there is no large concentration of financial resources
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required to manage a large network. This also eliminates the single point of failure
problem, which could render a large number of systems unprotected if a network
were only protected by a single hardware firewall. Another advantage to embedding
the dynamic silicon firewall as close to the ethernet controller as possible is the re-
duction in queueing delay, which occurs when packets are concentrated at a single
exit point to the external network because packet filtering requires time. Finally,
since the firewall rules are dependant upon network use, there is no need to learn
packet filtering syntax before being able to use the firewall. The dynamic silicon
firewall offers a simple network security solution for non-tech-saavy internet users.
7.3 Future Work
Though the overall goals of this research were met, there are a number of improve-
ments that would be required before this project could be included as part of a
larger device. To be included on an Ethernet network interface card for use with
a general purpose home computer, a bus interface and associated operating system
drivers would be needed. When designing any future hardware boards containing
the LAN91C111 and the dynamic silicon firewall, the ARDY signal should be used
in conjunction with the asynchronous bus interface to the Ethernet chip. This would
reduce the time it takes to filter a network packet by roughly one-third. Care should
also be taken to limit the reliance of the final design on any software. For example,
the dynamic aspect of the project is currently provided by a hardware timer whose
interrupts trigger a software routine to remove IP addresses from CAM. If the Nios R©
processor were hacked, a malicious programmer could potentially cause early removal
of IP addresses, leading to a denial of service attack. This is quite unlikely, since
the Nios R© processor does not run a real-time operating system, however the timer
interrupt could be fed into another custom Verilog module, which then does the IP
address removal. This would limit the ability to remove any individual IP addresses
early, and further isolate the embedded firewall from the general purpose computer.
The dynamic silicon firewall could also be tailored for use with other systems,
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such as cellular phones or other network-capable devices. Viruses and malicious
programs have been written to prove that portable network devices, such as cellular
phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs), are susceptible to network attack.
Since these devices have limited resources, using a software firewall to protect them
would impact device performance. Including the dynamic silicon firewall in a PDA
would be an effective solution to the problem of mobile device network security. This
would likely require a number of changes to the dynamic silicon firewall system to
operate with any wireless networking protocols being used by the device.
Administrative capabilities could be developed for information technology experts
that may be using the dynamic silicon firewall as part of a larger layered network
security approach. In this case, the dynamic silicon firewall would be distributed in
each computer in a corporate network, and there would still likely be a large gateway
firewall separating the internal network from the internet. Currently, packets which
are filtered out by the dynamic silicon firewall are simply dropped. If this project was
used as part of a large corporate network, it would be desirable to keep information
such as how many packets have been dropped and where those dropped packets
originated. An administrative access point could be created so that information
technology experts could then retrieve this stored data for use in improving overall
network security. This would also open up the ability to distribute or synchronize
the firewall filtering rules amongst the different dynamic silicon firewalls in the local
network.
Changes to the dynamic silicon firewall could be made to add filtering capabilities
to different network layers. For example, the same technology being used for IP
address filtering could be used for port filtering at the transport layer or MAC
address filtering at the data link layer. This would offer additional capabilities, like
restricting specific network applications such as instant messaging or web browsing.
Due to the parallelism afforded by use of content-addressable memory, there would
be little additional delay in adding these features, at the expense of a larger overall
design in terms of the logic elements required to synthesize the project.
Finally, stateful packet filtering could be investigated to provide additional func-
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tionality. Stateless packet filters make filtering decisions by comparing the filter rules
with the static header information contained in each network packet. Stateful packet
filters add information based on communication history to the filtering decision. This
could add a layer of protection when connection-oriented network protocols are in
operation. When stateful communication is initiated with an outgoing packet, infor-
mation about the source and destination sockets would be stored. Incoming packets
would then be inspected to examine the connection state before a filtering decision
would be made. This is needed for connection-oriented protocols, such as TCP, when
connection state needs to be maintained, regardless of how often data packets are
sent and received. In the current design of the dynamic silicon firewall state is not
maintained, and if there is no constant communication, then the connection is bro-
ken when the IP addresses are flushed from the CAM. To implement stateful packet
filtering, additional information would need to be stored, such as transport layer
ports, connection state for connection-oriented protocols, and a time-stamp for each
individual entry. This way, each entry would only be removed after the connection
was closed, or after an individual pre-determined time interval had passed.
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Appendix A
Verilog Code
/∗
sfw . v − S i l i c o n F i r ewa l l
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
module sfw ( c lk , enablen , r e s e t , nedk int , tx r eque s t ,
n i o s n edk i o r , n ios nedk iow , n ios nedk addr ,
n ios cam pattern , n i o s cam ct l , n i o s b i d i r d a t a ,
n i o s r am ct l , ram data out , enet data , mode in , tx a l lowed
, en e t i o r , enet iow , enet addr , n i o s nedk in t , l e d s ) ;
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ Inputs
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
input c l k ; // system c l o c k
input r e s e t ; // r e s e t s i g n a l
input enablen ; // enab l e a c t i v e low s i g n a l
input mode in ; // nios mode s i g n a l
input nedk int ; //91c111 i n t e r r u p t s i g n a l
input t x r eque s t ; // nios r e qu e s t i n g i t wants to t ransmi t
input n i o s n edk i o r ; // nios nedk read pu l s e
input n ios nedk iow ; // nios nedk wr i t e pu l s e
input [ 2 : 0 ] n ios nedk addr ; // nios nedk address
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] n io s cam patte rn ; // nios cam pa t t e rn
input [ 7 : 0 ] n i o s c am c t l ; // nios cam address , enab l e and
read or wr i t e command
input [ 1 0 : 0 ] n i o s r am c t l ; // nios ram enable , addre s se s
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ B i d i r e c t i o n a l po r t s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
inout [ 1 5 : 0 ] n i o s b i d i r d a t a ; // enet data to n ios
inout [ 1 5 : 0 ] enet data ; //91c111 data
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ Outputs
68
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
output e n e t i o r ; //91c111 read enab l e ( a c t i v e low )
output enet iow ; //91c111 wr i t e enab l e ( a c t i v e low )
output [ 2 : 0 ] enet addr ; //91c111 address
output n i o s n edk i n t ; // i n t e r r u p t n ios t h i n k s i s from nedk
output tx a l l owed ; // a l l ow nios to t x
output ram data out ; //ram output f o r n ios
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ Outputs f o r t e s t i n g purposes
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
output [ 1 : 0 ] l e d s ;
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ Reg i s t e r s f o r Outputs
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
reg en e t i o r , enet iow ;
reg [ 2 : 0 ] enet addr ;
reg n i o s n edk i n t ;
reg tx a l l owed ;
reg ram data out ; //ram output f o r n ios
reg [ 1 : 0 ] l e d s ;
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ Reg i s t e r s f o r l o c a l use
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
reg [ 3 1 : 0 ] cam pattern ; // pa t t e rn to wr i t e or read in CAM
reg [ 4 : 0 ] wraddr e s s s i g ; //cam wr i t e address
reg cam cmd ; //cam read when 0 , wr i t e when 1
reg cam en ; //cam c l o c k enab l e
reg cam mfound d , cam mfound s ; //cam match found
reg wrbusy s ig d , wrbusy s i g s ; //cam wr i t e busy ( might not
use )
reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] data to 91c111 ; // sfw data to enet
reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] data from 91c111 ; // sfw data from enet
reg [ 2 : 0 ] command cycle ; //hw mode s t a t e s
reg [ 4 : 0 ] t im ing cy c l e ; // c l o c k c y c l e counter f o r s t a t e s
reg a rp rx tx ; // rx or t x occur ing f o r ARP hand l ing
reg i r q i n p r o g r e s s ; //1 i f an i r q i s in progre s s
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reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] saved bank ; // saved bank s e l e c t r e g i s t e r
reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] s aved po in t e r ; // saved po in t e r r e g i s t e r
reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] ISR data ; // i n t e r r u p t r e g i s t e r
reg [ 5 : 0 ] las t packet num ; //number o f l a s t t ransmi t t ed
packe t
reg [ 1 : 0 ] wa i t r e tu rn ; // r e g i s t e r f o r r e tu rn ing from wai t
s t a t e
reg sw mode f lag ; // f l a g to t e l l s fw to turn over to Nios
reg [ 2 : 0 ] s fw nedk addr ; // sfw address f o r enet
reg s fw nedk io r , s fw nedk iow ; // sfw nedk read/ wr i t e pu l s e s
reg sfw cam cmd , sfw cam en ; // sfw cam enab l e and read or
wr i t e command
reg [ 3 1 : 0 ] s fw cam pattern ; // sfw cam pa t t e rn
reg [ 4 : 0 ] s fw wradd r e s s s i g ; // sfw cam wr i t e address
reg [ 4 : 0 ] maddress d , maddress s ; //cam match address
reg sfw ram wren ; // sfw ram wr i t e enab l e
reg [ 4 : 0 ] s fw ram wraddress ; // sfw ram wr i t e address
reg ram wren ; //ram wr i t e enab l e
reg [ 4 : 0 ] ram wraddress ; //ram wr i t e address
reg r am wr i t e r equ i r ed ;
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ parameter i ze 91c111 r e g i s t e r IDs so the code
∗ i s more readab le , or at l e a s t more ”Altera− l i k e ”
∗ more in format ion on 91c111 r e g i s t e r s in da ta shee t
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
parameter mmu reg = 3 ’ d0 ;
parameter pnr reg = 3 ’ d1 ;
parameter f i f o r e g = 3 ’ d2 ;
parameter po i n t e r r e g = 3 ’ d3 ;
parameter data1 reg = 3 ’ d4 ;
parameter data2 reg = 3 ’ d5 ;
parameter i n t e r r up t r e g = 3 ’ d6 ;
parameter b s r r e g = 3 ’ d7 ;
// Hardware/ Sof tware Mode Parameters
parameter SW = 1 ’ d0 ;
parameter HW = 1 ’d1 ;
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ The Core
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∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
always @ (posedge c l k )
begin
i f ( enablen ) // f i r e w a l l d i s a b l e d
begin
tx a l l owed <= 1 ;
n i o s n edk i n t <= nedk int ;
i r q i n p r o g r e s s <= 0 ;
sw mode f lag <= 0 ;
command cycle <= 0 ;
t im ing cy c l e <= 0 ;
s fw nedk i o r <= 1 ;
s fw nedk iow <= 1 ;
s fw cam pattern <= 0 ;
sfw cam en <= 0 ;
sfw cam cmd <= 0 ;
sfw ram wren <= 0 ;
s fw ram wraddress <= 0 ;
l e d s [ 1 ] <= 1 ;
l e d s [ 0 ] <= 1 ;
end
else i f ( ( nedk int==1)&&( i r q i n p r o g r e s s==0)&&(mode in==HW)
&&(tx a l l owed==0)&&(n i o s n edk i n t==0))
//new i n t e r r u p t case occurs when e t h e rne t i n t e r r u p t occurs ,
t h e r e i s no e t h e rne t i n t e r r u p t a l r eady be ing processed ,
the system i s in hardware mode , and no communication i s
a l l owed between Nios and 91c111
begin // s t a r t p roce s s ing e t h e rne t i n t e r r u p t in case
s ta tements
command cycle <= 0 ;
t im ing cy c l e <= 0 ;
i r q i n p r o g r e s s <= 1 ;
l e d s [ 0 ] <= 1 ;
end
else i f ( i r q i n p r o g r e s s==0)
begin
// we ’ re doing nothing , n e i t h e r a new int , nor one in
progress , t h i s may mean so f tware mode , or communication i s
a l r eady a l l owed between Nios and 91c111
// l e t ’ s see i f Nios wants to t a l k to the 91c111 , i f so , l e t
i t , s ince we are doing noth ing wi th the 91c111
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i f ( ( t x r eque s t==1)&&(mode in==HW) )
tx a l l owed <= 1 ;
else
tx a l l owed <= 0 ;
// i f we ’ re a l r eady in so f tware mode , then the Nios i s
handl ing , or has handled , the most recen t i n t e r r u p t from
the SFW, make sure we don ’ t ask the Nios to check f o r
i n t e r r u p t s n e e d l e s s l y
i f ( mode in==SW)
n i o s n edk i n t <= 0 ;
// prepare system fo r next 91c111 i n t e r r u p t
command cycle <= 0 ;
t im ing cy c l e <= 0 ;
l e d s [ 0 ] <= 0 ;
end
else // i n t in progress , so handle i t
begin
case ( command cycle )
// save ch ip s t a tu s , read i n t e r r u p t to determine next s t a t e
0 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : s fw nedk addr = bs r r e g ; // ge t bank s e l e c t r e g i s t e r
2 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 3 : wai t f o r v a l i d read
4 : begin
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
data to 91c111 = 16 ’ d2 ; //go to bank 2
saved bank = data from 91c111 ; // save bsr
end
5 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ; // wr i t e b s r to bank 2
6 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
7 : s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ; // ge t po in t e r r e g i s t e r
8 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 9 : wai t f o r v a l i d read
10 : begin
s aved po in t e r = data from 91c111 ; // save po in t e r
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
11 : s fw nedk addr = i n t e r r up t r e g ;
12 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 13: wai t f o r v a l i d read
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14 : begin
ISR data = data from 91c111 ; // read i n t r e g i s t e r
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
15 : i f ( ISR data [ 5 : 4 ] == 2 ’ b11 ) // both overrrun & EPH
in t s
begin
data to 91c111 = { ISR data [ 1 5 : 8 ] , 8 ’ h30 } ;
s fw nedk iow = 0 ; //ack the eph and overrun i n t s
end
else i f ( ISR data [ 4 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // j u s t overrrun i n t
begin
data to 91c111 = { ISR data [ 1 5 : 8 ] , 8 ’ h10 } ;
s fw nedk iow = 0 ; //ack the overrun i n t
end
else i f ( ISR data [ 5 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // j u s t EPH in t
begin
data to 91c111 = { ISR data [ 1 5 : 8 ] , 8 ’ h20 } ;
s fw nedk iow = 0 ; //ack the eph i n t
end
else i f ( ISR data [ 0 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // r e c i e v e i n t
begin
command cycle = 1 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
else i f ( ISR data [ 1 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // transmi t i n t
begin
command cycle = 2 ; // t x i n t e r r u p t
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
else command cycle = 3 ; //no int , r e s t o r e ch ip
16 : begin // shou ld on ly g e t pas t 15 i f eph or ovrn
s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
i f ( ISR data [ 0 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // r e c i e v e i n t
command cycle = 1 ;
else i f ( ISR data [ 1 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) // transmi t i n t
command cycle = 2 ; // t x i n t e r r u p t
else // no i n t
command cycle = 3 ; // r e s t o r e ch ip
end
endcase
end
// read r e c i e v ed packe t s t a t u s
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1 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : begin
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ;
data to 91c111 = 16 ’hA000 ; // read from s t a r t rx area
end
2 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
3 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
4 : begin
s fw nedk addr = data1 reg ; //where to ge t s t a t u s from
command cycle = 5 ; // wai t f o r p r e f e t c h
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
wa i t r e tu rn = 0 ;
end
5 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 6 : wai t f o r v a l i d read
7 : begin
i f ( data from 91c111 & 16 ’hAC00) // i f t h e r e were ANY
rcv e r ro r s
begin
command cycle = 4 ; // r e l e a s e packe t
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
else
begin
command cycle = 6 ; // read e t h e r t y p e
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
a rp rx tx = 0 ;
end
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
8 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ; // wr i t e to po in t e r address
9 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
10 : begin
s fw nedk addr = data1 reg ;
command cycle = 5 ; // wai t f o r p r e f e t c h
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
wa i t r e tu rn = 1 ;
end
11 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 12: wai t f o r v a l i d read
13 : begin
s fw cam pattern [ 3 1 : 1 6 ] = data from 91c111 ; //upper ip
word
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s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
// 14: s fw nedk addr = da ta2 reg ;
15 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 16: wai t f o r v a l i d read
17 : begin
s fw cam pattern [ 1 5 : 0 ] = data from 91c111 ; // lower ip
word
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
sfw cam cmd = 0 ; // s e t cam to read
end
18 : sfw cam en = 1 ; // enab l e cam c l o c k s
20 : begin
i f ( ( cam mfound d==1) | ( cam mfound s==1))
begin
// prepare turn over to n ios
sw mode f lag = 1 ;
command cycle = 3 ; // r e s t o r e ch ip s t a t u s
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
else
begin
command cycle = 4 ; // r e l e a s e packe t
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
sfw cam en = 0 ; // d i s a b l e cam
end
endcase
end
// read transmi t packe t number
2 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : s fw nedk addr = f i f o r e g ; // ge t t x pk t num
2 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 3 : wai t f o r v a l i d read
4 : begin
l a s t packet num = data from 91c111 [ 5 : 0 ] ;
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
5 : begin
data to 91c111 = {10 ’d0 , las t packet num [ 5 : 0 ] } ;
s fw nedk addr = pnr reg ;
end
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6 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ; // wr i t e pk t num to pnr
7 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ; // ge t t x s t a t u s
8 : begin
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ;
data to 91c111 = 16 ’ h2000 ; // s e t po in ter , read t x area
end
9 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
10 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
11 : begin
s fw nedk addr = data1 reg ;
command cycle = 5 ; // wai t f o r p r e f e t c h
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
wa i t r e tu rn = 2 ;
end
12 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 13: wai t f o r v a l i d read
14 : begin
i f ( data from 91c111 [ 0 ] == 1 ’ b0 ) // t x f a i l e d
begin
sfw cam cmd = 0 ; //make sure cam i s in read mode
t im ing cy c l e = 28 ; //do the t x i n t ack ( wi th cam read )
end
r am wr i t e r equ i r ed = 0 ;
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
15 : begin // read t x e t h e r t y p e
command cycle = 6 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
a rp rx tx = 1 ;
end
// put ip in t o cam fo r t x
16 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ; // t x succeeded ge t ip
17 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
18 : begin
s fw nedk addr = data1 reg ;
command cycle = 5 ; // wai t f o r p r e f e t c h
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
wa i t r e tu rn = 3 ;
end
19 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 20: wai t f o r v a l i d read
21 : begin
s fw cam pattern [ 3 1 : 1 6 ] = data from 91c111 ; //upper word
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
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// 22: s fw nedk addr = da ta2 reg ;
23 : begin
s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
sfw cam cmd = 0 ; // ensure cam read mode
end
// 24: wai t f o r v a l i d read
25 : begin
s fw cam pattern [ 1 5 : 0 ] = data from 91c111 ; // lower word
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
26 : sfw cam en = 1 ; // enab l e cam c l o c k to check i f i p i s
in cam
28 : begin
i f ( ( cam mfound d==0)&(cam mfound s==0)) //IP not in
CAM
begin
//we need to put IP in cam
sfw cam cmd = 1 ; // wr i t e to cam
// pu t t i n g IP in RAM cache at same address as CAM
s fw ram wraddress = wraddr e s s s i g ;
r am wr i t e r equ i r ed = 1 ;
end
else //IP in CAM
begin
i f ( cam mfound d==1)
begin
// s e t ram address to match address o f CAM
s fw ram wraddress = maddress d ;
r am wr i t e r equ i r ed = 1 ;
end
end
end
29 : begin
s fw nedk addr = i n t e r r up t r e g ; // goto i n t reg to ack TX
in t
data to 91c111 = { ISR data [ 1 5 : 8 ] , 8 ’ h02 } ; //ack TX in t
end
30 : begin
sfw cam en = 0 ; //needed max 2 c l o c k c y c l e s i f a cam
wr i t e
s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
i f ( r am wr i t e r equ i r ed==1)
sfw ram wren = 1 ;
end
31 : begin
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s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
sfw ram wren = 0 ;
sfw cam cmd = 0 ;
// prepare turn over to n ios
command cycle = 3 ; // r e s t o r e ch ip s t a t u s
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
endcase
end
// r e s t o r e ch ip s t a t u s
3 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : begin // r e s t o r e po in t e r
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ;
data to 91c111 = saved po in t e r ;
end
2 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
3 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
4 : begin
s fw nedk addr = bs r r e g ; // r e s t o r e bank
data to 91c111 = saved bank ;
end
5 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
6 : begin
s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
i f ( sw mode f lag == 1)
n i o s n edk i n t =1;
end
7 : begin
sw mode f lag = 0 ;
i r q i n p r o g r e s s = 0 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
command cycle = 0 ;
end
endcase
end
// r e l e a s e packe t
4 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : begin
s fw nedk addr = mmu reg ;
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data to 91c111 = 16 ’ h0080 ; // i s s u e remove & r e l e a s e
end
2 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ; // wr i t e r&r
3 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
// wai t a coup le c l o c k c y c l e s between p o l l i n g
6 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ; // read busy b i t
// 7 : wai t f o r v a l i d read
8 : begin
i f ( data from 91c111 [ 0 ] ) // then busy
t im ing cy c l e = 4 ;
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
end
9 : begin
command cycle = 3 ; // a f t e r remove and r e l e a s e i s
r e s t o r e ch ip
t im ing cy c l e = 0 ;
end
endcase
end
// wai t s t a t e f o r n ios data p r e f e t c h (370 ns t o t a l , 12 c l o c k s
here though )
5 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
12 : i f ( wa i t r e tu rn==2’d0 )
begin
command cycle = 1 ; // rx s t a t u s
t im ing cy c l e = 4 ;
end
else i f ( wa i t r e tu rn==2’d1 )
begin
command cycle = 1 ; // rx ip
t im ing cy c l e = 10 ;
end
else i f ( wa i t r e tu rn==2’d2 )
begin
command cycle = 2 ; // t x s t a t u s
t im ing cy c l e = 11 ;
end
else
begin
command cycle = 2 ; // t x ip
t im ing cy c l e = 18 ;
end
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endcase
end
// wai t s t a t e f o r read ing e t h e r t y p e
6 : begin
t im ing cy c l e = t im ing cy c l e + 5 ’ d1 ;
case ( t im ing cy c l e )
1 : begin // s e t po in t e r to read e t h e r t y p e
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ;
i f ( a rp rx tx==0)
begin
data to 91c111 = 16 ’hA010 ; // rx
end
else
begin
data to 91c111 = 16 ’ h2010 ; // t x
end
end
2 : s fw nedk iow = 0 ;
3 : s fw nedk iow = 1 ;
//4−15: wai t f o r pre−f e t c h
16 : s fw nedk addr = data1 reg ;
17 : s fw nedk i o r = 0 ;
// 18: wai t f o r v a l i d read
19 : begin
s fw nedk i o r = 1 ;
i f ( a rp rx tx == 0) // r e c e i v e
begin
// s e t po in t e r f o r source ip
i f ( data from 91c111 == 16 ’ h0608 )
begin
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ; //ARP
data to 91c111 = 16 ’ hE020 ;
command cycle = 1 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 7 ;
// prepare turn over to n ios f o r ARP pkt
// sw mode f lag = 1;
//command cycle = 3; // r e s t o r e ch ip s t a t u s
// t im in g c y c l e = 0;
end
else
begin
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s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ; //IP
data to 91c111 = 16 ’hE01E ;
command cycle = 1 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 7 ;
end
end
else // transmi t
begin
i f ( data from 91c111 == 16 ’ h0608 )
begin
//command cycle = 2; //ARP
// t im in g c y c l e = 28;
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ;
data to 91c111 = 16 ’h602A ;
command cycle = 2 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 15 ;
end
else
begin
s fw nedk addr = po i n t e r r e g ; //IP
data to 91c111 = 16 ’ h6022 ;
command cycle = 2 ;
t im ing cy c l e = 15 ;
end
end
end
endcase
end
endcase
end
end
// i n s t a n t i a t e the module t ha t w r i t e s s e q u en t i a l addre s se s
f o r the CAM
cam addresser c a i n s t (
. r e s e t ( enablen ) ,
. wraddress ( s fw wradd r e s s s i g ) ,
. sfw cam cmd ( sfw cam cmd )
) ;
// i n s t a n t i a t e the dynamic cam
sfwcam dyn cam inst (
. patte rn ( cam pattern ) ,
. wraddress ( wraddr e s s s i g ) ,
. wren ( cam cmd ) ,
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. i n c l o c k ( ˜ c l k ) ,
. i n c l o cken ( cam en ) ,
. outc lock ( c l k ) ,
. outc locken ( cam en ) ,
. maddress ( maddress d ) ,
. mfound ( cam mfound d ) ,
. wrbusy ( wrbusy s ig d )
) ;
// i n s t a n t i a t e the s t a t i c cam fo r t e s t i n g
sfwcam s t a t c am in s t (
. patte rn ( cam pattern ) ,
. wraddress ( wraddr e s s s i g ) ,
. wren ( n i o s c am c t l [ 7 ] ) ,
. i n c l o c k ( ˜ c l k ) ,
. i n c l o cken ( cam en ) ,
. outc lock ( c l k ) ,
. outc locken ( cam en ) ,
. maddress ( maddress s ) ,
. mfound ( cam mfound s ) ,
. wrbusy ( wrbusy s i g s )
) ;
// i n s t a n t i a t e the ram , nios & sfw need wr i t e acces s
ip ram ip ram in s t (
. data ( mode in ) , // j u s t because we want data=1 when HW
mode and 0 during SW mode i t works out w e l l
. wraddress ( ram wraddress ) ,
. rdaddress ( n i o s r am c t l [ 4 : 0 ] ) ,
. wren ( ram wren ) ,
. c l o ck ( ˜ c l k ) ,
. q ( ram data out )
) ;
// i n s t a n t i a t e the g l u e l o g i c (muxes and such )
g l u e l o g i c g l u e l o g i c i n s t (
. s fw nedk i o r ( s fw nedk i o r ) ,
. n i o s n edk i o r ( n i o s n edk i o r ) ,
. e n e t i o r ( e n e t i o r ) ,
. s fw nedk iow ( s fw nedk iow ) ,
. n io s nedk iow ( n ios nedk iow ) ,
. enet iow ( enet iow ) ,
. s fw nedk addr ( s fw nedk addr ) ,
. n io s nedk addr ( n ios nedk addr ) ,
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. enet addr ( enet addr ) ,
. s fw wradd r e s s s i g ( s fw wradd r e s s s i g ) ,
. n i o s w r add r e s s s i g ( n i o s c am c t l [ 4 : 0 ] ) ,
. w raddr e s s s i g ( wraddr e s s s i g ) ,
. data from 91c111 ( data from 91c111 ) ,
. data to 91c111 ( data to 91c111 ) ,
. n i o s b i d i r d a t a ( n i o s b i d i r d a t a ) ,
. enet data ( enet data ) ,
. mode ( mode in ) ,
. s fw cam pattern ( s fw cam pattern ) ,
. n io s cam patte rn ( n io s cam patte rn ) ,
. cam pattern ( cam pattern ) ,
. sfw cam cmd ( sfw cam cmd ) ,
. nios cam cmd ( n i o s c am c t l [ 5 ] ) ,
. cam cmd ( cam cmd ) ,
. sfw cam en ( sfw cam en ) ,
. n ios cam en ( n i o s c am c t l [ 6 ] ) ,
. cam en ( cam en ) ,
. s fw ram wraddress ( s fw ram wraddress ) ,
. n ios ram wraddress ( n i o s r am c t l [ 9 : 5 ] ) ,
. ram wraddress ( ram wraddress ) ,
. sfw ram wren ( sfw ram wren ) ,
. n ios ram wren ( n i o s r am c t l [ 1 0 ] ) ,
. ram wren ( ram wren ) ,
. c l k ( c l k )
) ;
endmodule
/∗
cam addresser . v − a s imple module to increment the address
used when s t o r i n g IP addres se s in the CAM
Darre l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
module cam addresser ( r e s e t , wraddress , sfw cam cmd ) ;
input r e s e t ;
input sfw cam cmd ;
output [ 4 : 0 ] wraddress ;
reg [ 4 : 0 ] wraddress ;
// changing ”negedge wrbusy” to ” posedge sfw cam cmd”
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always @(posedge r e s e t or posedge sfw cam cmd )
i f ( r e s e t )
wraddress = 0 ;
else
wraddress = wraddress + 5 ’ d1 ;
endmodule
/∗
ip ram . v − a dual−por t ram used in prov i d ing the dynamic
aspec t o f the SFW pro j ec t , b u i l t wi th the Al tera ram
lpm ram dp us ing the megafunction wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPM RAMDP%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: lpm ram dp
module ip ram (
data ,
wraddress ,
rdaddress ,
wren ,
c lock ,
q ) ;
input [ 0 : 0 ] data ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] wraddress ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] rdaddress ;
input wren ;
input c l o ck ;
output [ 0 : 0 ] q ;
wire [ 0 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 0 : 0 ] q = sub wire0 [ 0 : 0 ] ;
lpm ram dp lpm ram dp component (
. rdc l o ck ( c l o ck ) ,
. wren (wren ) ,
. wrc lock ( c l o ck ) ,
. data ( data ) ,
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. rdaddress ( rdaddress ) ,
. wraddress ( wraddress ) ,
. q ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm ram dp component . lpm width = 1 ,
lpm ram dp component . lpm widthad = 5 ,
lpm ram dp component . rden used = ”FALSE” ,
lpm ram dp component . i n t ended dev i c e f am i l y
= ”APEX20KE” ,
lpm ram dp component . lpm type = ”LPMRAMDP”
,
lpm ram dp component . lpm indata = ”
REGISTERED” ,
lpm ram dp component . lpm wraddre s s cont ro l =
”REGISTERED” ,
lpm ram dp component . l pm rdaddre s s con t ro l =
”REGISTERED” ,
lpm ram dp component . lpm outdata = ”
UNREGISTERED” ,
lpm ram dp component . use eab = ”ON” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: WidthData NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: WidthAddr NUMERIC ”5”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: Clock NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: rden NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: UseDPRAM NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: INTENDED DEVICE FAMILY STRING ”
APEX20KE”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGdata NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGwraddress NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGwren NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGrdaddress NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGrren NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: REGq NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: enab l e NUMERIC ”0”
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// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRdata NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRwraddress NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRwren NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRrdaddress NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRrren NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: CLRq NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: BlankMemory NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: MIFfilename STRING ””
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: UseLCs NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTHAD NUMERIC ”5”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: RDEN USED STRING ”FALSE”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: INTENDED DEVICE FAMILY STRING ”
APEX20KE”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPM RAMDP”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM INDATA STRING ”REGISTERED”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWRADDRESSCONTROL STRING ”
REGISTERED”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMRDADDRESS CONTROL STRING ”
REGISTERED”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMOUTDATA STRING ”
UNREGISTERED”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: USE EAB STRING ”ON”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data 0 0 1 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data [ 0 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: q 0 0 1 0 OUTPUT NODEFVAL q
[ 0 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: wraddress 0 0 5 0 INPUT
NODEFVAL wraddress [ 4 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: rdaddress 0 0 5 0 INPUT
NODEFVAL rdaddress [ 4 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: wren 0 0 0 0 INPUT VCC wren
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: c l o c k 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
c l o c k
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 1 0 data 0 0 1 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: q 0 0 1 0 @q 0 0 1 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @wraddress 0 0 5 0 wraddress 0 0
5 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @rdaddress 0 0 5 0 rdaddress 0 0
5 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @wren 0 0 0 0 wren 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @wrclock 0 0 0 0 c l o c k 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @rdclock 0 0 0 0 c l o c k 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
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/∗
sfwcam2 . v − t h i s module c r e a t e s a 32 entry , 32− b i t CAM. I t
does t h i s by connect ing t o g e t h e r 16 entry , 5− b i t CAM
modules which , in turn , are crea t ed us ing dua l por t RAM
in s t a n t i a t e d from the Al tera ram al tsyncram component .
More in format ion on the method used can be found in the
X i l i n x document ”xapp204 . pdf ”
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
module sfwcam2 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern , wrpos , wren ,
w r i t e e r a s e , pos , mfound ) ;
input clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] patte rn ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] wrpos ;
input wren , w r i t e e r a s e ;
output [ 3 1 : 0 ] pos ;
output mfound ;
wire [ 1 5 : 0 ] p0 , p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 , p5 , p6 , p7 , p8 , p9 , p10 , p11 , p12 , p13 ;
cam16x5 cam0( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 4 : 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p0 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam1( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 9 : 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p1 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam2( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 1 4 : 1 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p2 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam3( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 1 9 : 1 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p3 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam4( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 2 4 : 2 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p4 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam5( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 2 9 : 2 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p5 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam6( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 3 4 : 3 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&˜wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p6 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam7( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 4 : 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p7 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
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cam16x5 cam8( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 9 : 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p8 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam9( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 1 4 : 1 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p9 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam10 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 1 9 : 1 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p10 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam11 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 2 4 : 2 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p11 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam12 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 2 9 : 2 5 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p12 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
cam16x5 cam13 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern [ 3 4 : 3 0 ] , wrpos
[ 3 : 0 ] , wren&wrpos [ 4 ] , w r i t e e r a s e , p13 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ) ;
assign pos={p13&p12&p11&p10&p9&p8&p7 , p6&p5&p4&p3&p2&p1&p0 } ;
assign mfound=pos [ 0 ] | pos [ 1 ] | pos [ 2 ] | pos [ 3 ] | pos [ 4 ] | pos [ 5 ] | pos
[ 6 ] | pos [ 7 ] | pos [ 8 ] | pos [ 9 ] | pos [ 1 0 ] | pos [ 1 1 ] | pos [ 1 2 ] | pos [ 1 3 ] |
pos [ 1 4 ] | pos [ 1 5 ] | pos [ 1 6 ] | pos [ 1 7 ] | pos [ 1 8 ] | pos [ 1 9 ] | pos [ 2 0 ] |
pos [ 2 1 ] | pos [ 2 2 ] | pos [ 2 3 ] | pos [ 2 4 ] | pos [ 2 5 ] | pos [ 2 6 ] | pos [ 2 7 ] |
pos [ 2 8 ] | pos [ 2 9 ] | pos [ 3 0 ] | pos [ 3 1 ] ;
endmodule
module cam16x5 ( clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 , pattern , wrpos , wren ,
w r i t e e r a s e , pos ) ;
input clk0 , c lken0 , c lk1 , c lken1 ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] patte rn ;
input [ 3 : 0 ] wrpos ;
input wren , w r i t e e r a s e ;
output [ 1 5 : 0 ] pos ;
a ltsyncram altsyncram component (
. c locken0 ( c lken0 ) ,
. c locken1 ( c lken1 ) ,
. wren a (wren ) ,
. c l ock0 ( c lk0 ) ,
. c l ock1 ( c lk1 ) ,
. addre s s a ({ pattern , wrpos })
,
. addres s b ( pattern ) ,
. data a ( w r i t e e r a s e ) ,
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. q b ( pos ) ) ;
defparam
altsyncram component . operat ion mode = ”
DUAL PORT” ,
altsyncram component . width a = 1 ,
altsyncram component . widthad a = 9 ,
altsyncram component . numwords a = 512 ,
altsyncram component . width b = 16 ,
altsyncram component . widthad b = 5 ,
altsyncram component . numwords b = 32 ,
altsyncram component . lpm type = ”altsyncram”
,
altsyncram component . width byteena a = 1 ,
altsyncram component . width byteena b = 1 ,
altsyncram component . outdata reg b = ”
UNREGISTERED” ,
altsyncram component . ou tdata r eg a = ”
UNREGISTERED” ,
altsyncram component . i n d a t a a c l r a = ”NONE” ,
altsyncram component . w r c on t r o l a c l r a = ”
NONE” ,
altsyncram component . a dd r e s s a c l r a = ”NONE”
,
altsyncram component . add r e s s r e g b = ”CLOCK1
” ,
altsyncram component . a dd r e s s a c l r b = ”NONE”
,
altsyncram component . ou tda ta a c l r b = ”NONE”
,
altsyncram component .
r ead dur ing wr i t e mode mixed por t s = ”
DONTCARE” ,
altsyncram component . ram block type = ”M512”
,
altsyncram component . i n t ended dev i c e f am i l y
= ” S t r a t i x ” ;
endmodule
/∗
g l u e l o g i c . v − t h i s module i n s t a n t i a t e s a l l o f the
in t e r connec t l o g i c used to connect the Nios CPU, s i l i c o n
f i r e w a l l module , CAM and Lan91c111 e t h e rne t ch ip
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
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∗/
module g l u e l o g i c ( s fw nedk io r , n i o s n edk i o r , e n e t i o r ,
s fw nedk iow , n ios nedk iow , enet iow , sfw nedk addr ,
n ios nedk addr , enet addr , s fw wraddre s s s i g ,
n i o s wradd r e s s s i g , wraddre s s s i g , data from 91c111 ,
data to 91c111 , n i o s b i d i r d a t a , enet data , mode ,
s fw cam pattern , n ios cam pattern , cam pattern ,
sfw cam cmd , nios cam cmd , cam cmd , sfw cam en ,
nios cam en , cam en , sfw ram wraddress , n ios ram wraddress
, ram wraddress , sfw ram wren , nios ram wren , ram wren , c l k
) ;
input s fw nedk io r , n i o s n edk i o r ; //
read s t r o b e s
input s fw nedk iow , n io s nedk iow ; // wr i t e
s t r o b e s
input [ 2 : 0 ] s fw nedk addr , n io s nedk addr ; // enet
addre s se s
input [ 1 5 : 0 ] data to 91c111 ; //
data going to 91c111
input mode ;
//HW or SW mode
input sfw cam cmd , nios cam cmd ; //
cam read or wr i t e command
input sfw cam en , nios cam en ; //
cam c l o c k enab l e
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] s fw cam pattern , n io s cam patte rn ;
// pa t t e rn f o r CAM
input [ 4 : 0 ] s fw wraddre s s s i g , n i o s w r add r e s s s i g ;
//cam wr i t e address
input [ 4 : 0 ] s fw ram wraddress , n ios ram wraddress ;
//ram wr i t e address
input sfw ram wren , nios ram wren ;
//ram wr i t e enab l e
input c l k ;
inout [ 1 5 : 0 ] n i o s b i d i r d a t a ; // nios
b i d i r e c t i o n a l data l i n e
inout [ 1 5 : 0 ] enet data ; //91
c111 data
output [ 1 5 : 0 ] data from 91c111 ; // data
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coming from 91c111
output e n e t i o r ;
//91c111 read enab l e ( a c t i v e low )
output enet iow ;
//91c111 wr i t e enab l e ( a c t i v e low )
output [ 2 : 0 ] enet addr ; //91
c111 address
output cam en , cam cmd ; //
cam enab l e and read or wr i t e command
output [ 3 1 : 0 ] cam pattern ; //
pa t t e rn to wr i t e or read in CAM
output [ 4 : 0 ] wraddr e s s s i g ; //
cam wr i t e address
output [ 4 : 0 ] ram wraddress ; //
ram wr i t e address
output ram wren ;
//ram wr i t e enab l e
reg de l ay s i g , de lay s fw nedk iow ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] w data from 91c111 ;
always @ (negedge c l k )
begin
i f ( s fw nedk iow == 0)
d e l a y s i g = 0 ;
else
d e l a y s i g = 1 ;
end
and and in s t ( de lay s fw nedk iow , d e l ay s i g , s fw nedk iow ) ;
io mux io mux inst ram wren (
. data1 ( sfw ram wren ) ,
. data0 ( nios ram wren ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( ram wren )
) ;
cam addr mux ram wraddr mux inst (
. data1x ( s fw ram wraddress ) ,
. data0x ( n ios ram wraddress ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( ram wraddress )
) ;
91
io mux i o mux in s t n edk i o r (
. data1 ( s fw nedk i o r ) ,
. data0 ( n i o s n edk i o r ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( e n e t i o r )
) ;
io mux io mux ins t nedk iow (
. data1 ( s fw nedk iow ) ,
. data0 ( n ios nedk iow ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( enet iow )
) ;
io mux io mux inst cam cmd (
. data1 ( sfw cam cmd ) ,
. data0 ( nios cam cmd ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( cam cmd )
) ;
io mux io mux inst cam en (
. data1 ( sfw cam en ) ,
. data0 ( nios cam en ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( cam en )
) ;
cam addr mux cam addr mux inst (
. data1x ( s fw wradd r e s s s i g ) ,
. data0x ( n i o s w r add r e s s s i g ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( wraddr e s s s i g )
) ;
cam pattern mux cam pattern mux inst (
. data1x ( s fw cam pattern ) ,
. data0x ( n io s cam patte rn ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( cam pattern )
) ;
nedk addr mux nedk addr mux inst (
. data1x ( s fw nedk addr ) ,
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. data0x ( n ios nedk addr ) ,
. s e l ( mode ) ,
. r e s u l t ( enet addr )
) ;
da ta l a t ch d a t a l a t c h i n s t (
. data ( w data from 91c111 ) ,
. gate ( ˜ s fw nedk i o r ) ,
. q ( data from 91c111 )
) ;
nedk bus mux nedk bus mux inst s fw (
. data ( data to 91c111 ) ,
. enabledt ( ˜ de lay s fw nedk iow ) ,
. enab l e t r ( ˜ s fw nedk i o r ) ,
. t r i d a t a ( enet data ) ,
. r e s u l t ( w data from 91c111 )
) ;
nedk bus mux nedk bus mux ins t n io s (
. data ( n i o s b i d i r d a t a ) ,
. enabledt ( ˜ n ios nedk iow ) ,
. enab l e t r ( ˜ n i o s n edk i o r ) ,
. t r i d a t a ( enet data ) ,
. r e s u l t ( n i o s b i d i r d a t a )
) ;
endmodule
/∗
d a t a l a t c h . v − a data l a t c h used to l a t c h the data ou tpu t s
o f the 91c111 chip , b u i l t wi th the Al tera l pm la t ch
func t i on us ing the megafunction wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPM LATCH%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: l pm la t ch
module da ta l a t ch (
data ,
gate ,
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q ) ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] data ;
input gate ;
output [ 3 1 : 0 ] q ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] q = sub wire0 [ 3 1 : 0 ] ;
lpm latch lpm latch component (
. data ( data ) ,
. gate ( gate ) ,
. q ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm latch component . lpm width = 32 ,
lpm latch component . lpm type = ”LPM LATCH” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: nBit NUMERIC ”32”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: a c l r NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: a s e t NUMERIC ”0”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”32”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPM LATCH”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data 0 0 32 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data [ 3 1 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: q 0 0 32 0 OUTPUT NODEFVAL q
[ 3 1 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: ga te 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
gate
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 32 0 data 0 0 32 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: q 0 0 32 0 @q 0 0 32 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @gate 0 0 0 0 ga te 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
/∗
io mux . v − a mu l t i p l e x e r f o r i n d i v i d u a l s i g n a l l i n e s , b u i l t
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with the Al tera mux lpm mux us ing the megafunction wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPMMUX%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: lpm mux
module io mux (
data1 ,
data0 ,
s e l ,
r e s u l t ) ;
input data1 ;
input data0 ;
input s e l ;
output r e s u l t ;
wire [ 0 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 0 : 0 ] sub wire1 = sub wire0 [ 0 : 0 ] ;
wire r e s u l t = sub wire1 ;
wire sub wire2 = s e l ;
wire sub wire3 = sub wire2 ;
wire sub wire4 = data0 ;
wire sub wire6 = data1 ;
wire [ 1 : 0 ] sub wire5 = { sub wire6 , sub wire4 } ;
lpm mux lpm mux component (
. s e l ( sub wire3 ) ,
. data ( sub wire5 ) ,
. r e s u l t ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm mux component . l pm s i z e = 2 ,
lpm mux component . lpm widths = 1 ,
lpm mux component . lpm width = 1 ,
lpm mux component . lpm type = ”LPMMUX” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
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// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM SIZE NUMERIC ”2”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTHS NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPMMUX”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: r e s u l t 0 0 0 0 OUTPUT NODEFVAL
r e s u l t
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data1 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data1
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data0 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: s e l 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL s e l
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: r e s u l t 0 0 0 0 @resu l t 0 0 1 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 1 1 data1 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 1 0 data0 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @sel 0 0 1 0 s e l 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
/∗
nedk addr mux . v − a mu l t i p l e x e r f o r the Ethernet address
l i n e s , b u i l t wi th the Al tera mux lpm mux us ing the
megafunction wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPMMUX%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: lpm mux
module nedk addr mux (
data1x ,
data0x ,
s e l ,
r e s u l t ) ;
input [ 2 : 0 ] data1x ;
input [ 2 : 0 ] data0x ;
input s e l ;
output [ 2 : 0 ] r e s u l t ;
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wire [ 2 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 2 : 0 ] r e s u l t = sub wire0 [ 2 : 0 ] ;
wire sub wire1 = s e l ;
wire sub wire2 = sub wire1 ;
wire [ 2 : 0 ] sub wire3 = data0x [ 2 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 2 : 0 ] sub wire5 = data1x [ 2 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 5 : 0 ] sub wire4 = { sub wire5 , sub wire3 } ;
lpm mux lpm mux component (
. s e l ( sub wire2 ) ,
. data ( sub wire4 ) ,
. r e s u l t ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm mux component . l pm s i z e = 2 ,
lpm mux component . lpm widths = 1 ,
lpm mux component . lpm width = 3 ,
lpm mux component . lpm type = ”LPMMUX” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM SIZE NUMERIC ”2”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTHS NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”3”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPMMUX”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: r e s u l t 0 0 3 0 OUTPUT NODEFVAL
r e s u l t [ 2 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data1x 0 0 3 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data1x [ 2 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data0x 0 0 3 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data0x [ 2 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: s e l 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL s e l
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: r e s u l t 0 0 3 0 @resu l t 0 0 3 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 3 3 data1x 0 0 3 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 3 0 data0x 0 0 3 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @sel 0 0 1 0 s e l 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
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/∗
nedk bus mux . v − a t r i−s t a t e mu l t i p l e x e r f o r the Ethernet
data l i n e s , b u i l t wi th the Al tera mux lpm mux us ing the
megafunction wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPM BUSTRI%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: l pm bu s t r i
module nedk bus mux (
data ,
enabledt ,
enab le t r ,
t r i da ta ,
r e s u l t ) ;
input [ 1 5 : 0 ] data ;
input enabledt ;
input enab l e t r ;
inout [ 1 5 : 0 ] t r i d a t a ;
output [ 1 5 : 0 ] r e s u l t ;
wire [ 1 5 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 1 5 : 0 ] r e s u l t = sub wire0 [ 1 5 : 0 ] ;
l pm bust r i lpm bustr i component (
. t r i d a t a ( t r i d a t a ) ,
. enab l e t r ( enab l e t r ) ,
. enabledt ( enabledt ) ,
. data ( data ) ,
. r e s u l t ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm bustr i component . lpm width = 16 ,
lpm bustr i component . lpm type = ”LPM BUSTRI”
;
endmodule
//
============================================================
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// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: nBit NUMERIC ”16”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : PRIVATE: BiDir NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”16”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPM BUSTRI”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: t r i d a t a 0 0 16 0 BIDIR
NODEFVAL t r i d a t a [ 1 5 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data 0 0 16 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data [ 1 5 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: enab l ed t 0 0 0 0 INPUT
NODEFVAL enab l e d t
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: r e s u l t 0 0 16 0 OUTPUT
NODEFVAL r e s u l t [ 1 5 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: ena b l e t r 0 0 0 0 INPUT
NODEFVAL enab l e t r
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: t r i d a t a 0 0 16 0 @tr ida ta 0 0 16
0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 16 0 data 0 0 16 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @enabledt 0 0 0 0 enab l ed t 0 0 0
0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: r e s u l t 0 0 16 0 @resu l t 0 0 16 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @enab le tr 0 0 0 0 ena b l e t r 0 0 0
0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
/∗
cam addr mux . v − a mu l t i p l e x e r f o r the cam address l i n e s ,
b u i l t wi th the Al tera mux lpm mux us ing the megafunction
wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPMMUX%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: lpm mux
module cam addr mux (
data1x ,
data0x ,
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s e l ,
r e s u l t ) ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] data1x ;
input [ 4 : 0 ] data0x ;
input s e l ;
output [ 4 : 0 ] r e s u l t ;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] r e s u l t = sub wire0 [ 4 : 0 ] ;
wire sub wire1 = s e l ;
wire sub wire2 = sub wire1 ;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] sub wire3 = data0x [ 4 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 4 : 0 ] sub wire5 = data1x [ 4 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 9 : 0 ] sub wire4 = { sub wire5 , sub wire3 } ;
lpm mux lpm mux component (
. s e l ( sub wire2 ) ,
. data ( sub wire4 ) ,
. r e s u l t ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
lpm mux component . l pm s i z e = 2 ,
lpm mux component . lpm widths = 1 ,
lpm mux component . lpm width = 5 ,
lpm mux component . lpm type = ”LPMMUX” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM SIZE NUMERIC ”2”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTHS NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”5”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPMMUX”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: r e s u l t 0 0 5 0 OUTPUT NODEFVAL
r e s u l t [ 4 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data1x 0 0 5 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data1x [ 4 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data0x 0 0 5 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
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data0x [ 4 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: s e l 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL s e l
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: r e s u l t 0 0 5 0 @resu l t 0 0 5 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 5 5 data1x 0 0 5 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 5 0 data0x 0 0 5 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @sel 0 0 1 0 s e l 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
/∗
cam pattern mux . v − a mu l t i p l e x e r f o r the cam pa t t e rn l i n e s ,
b u i l t wi th the Al tera mux lpm mux us ing the megafunction
wizard
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
// megafunction wizard : %LPMMUX%
// GENERATION: STANDARD
// VERSION: WM1.0
// MODULE: lpm mux
module cam pattern mux (
data1x ,
data0x ,
s e l ,
r e s u l t ) ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] data1x ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] data0x ;
input s e l ;
output [ 3 1 : 0 ] r e s u l t ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] sub wire0 ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] r e s u l t = sub wire0 [ 3 1 : 0 ] ;
wire sub wire1 = s e l ;
wire sub wire2 = sub wire1 ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] sub wire3 = data0x [ 3 1 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 3 1 : 0 ] sub wire5 = data1x [ 3 1 : 0 ] ;
wire [ 6 3 : 0 ] sub wire4 = { sub wire5 , sub wire3 } ;
lpm mux lpm mux component (
. s e l ( sub wire2 ) ,
. data ( sub wire4 ) ,
. r e s u l t ( sub wire0 ) ) ;
defparam
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lpm mux component . l pm s i z e = 2 ,
lpm mux component . lpm widths = 1 ,
lpm mux component . lpm width = 32 ,
lpm mux component . lpm type = ”LPMMUX” ;
endmodule
//
============================================================
// CNX f i l e r e t r i e v a l i n f o
//
============================================================
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM SIZE NUMERIC ”2”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTHS NUMERIC ”1”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPMWIDTH NUMERIC ”32”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONSTANT: LPM TYPE STRING ”LPMMUX”
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: r e s u l t 0 0 32 0 OUTPUT
NODEFVAL r e s u l t [ 3 1 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data1x 0 0 32 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data1x [ 3 1 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: data0x 0 0 32 0 INPUT NODEFVAL
data0x [ 3 1 . . 0 ]
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : USED PORT: s e l 0 0 0 0 INPUT NODEFVAL s e l
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: r e s u l t 0 0 32 0 @resu l t 0 0 32 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 32 32 data1x 0 0 32 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @data 0 0 32 0 data0x 0 0 32 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : CONNECT: @sel 0 0 1 0 s e l 0 0 0 0
// Re t r i e v a l i n f o : LIBRARY: lpm lpm . lpm components . a l l
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Appendix B
C Code
/∗
S i l i c o n F i r ewa l l
Dar r e l l Laturnas , Un i v e r s i t y o f Saskatchewan
TRLabs , Saskatoon , Saskatchewan , Canada
∗/
//SFW pio manipu la t ions f o r t e s t i n g
#include ” ex ca l i bu r . h”
// parame te r i za t i ons
#define CAMREAD 0xDF // use &=
#define CAMWRITE D 0x20 // use |=
#define CAMWRITE S 0x80 // use |=
#define CAMENABLE 0x40 // use |=
#define CAM DISABLE 0x00 // use &=
#define RAMWRITE 0x400 // use |=
// pro to t ype s
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e c am (void ) ;
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e r am (void ) ;
void s fw tx r e qu e s t (void ) ;
int s fw get mode (void ) ;
void s fw set mode ( int mode) ;
void c am f l u s h i s r ( int context ) ;
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e t i m e r (void ) ;
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s f w i n i t i a l i z e c am
//
// put important ip addres se s in CAM
//
// a f t e r t e s t i n g , may s t i l l need to i n i t i a l i z e wi th IPs
// dhcp on boot−up f o r example
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e c am (void )
{
int j ;
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// d i s a b l e f i r e w a l l
na enab len p io−>np piodata = 1 ;
// s e t to so f tware mode and t a l k to cam
na mode out−>np piodata = 0 ;
// s e t to read mode and d i s a b l e CAM
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
// s e t CAM pat t e rn to zero
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0 ;
// loop through and i n i t i a l i z e the CAM with empty e n t r i e s
for ( j = 0 ; j < 32 ; j++)
{
// s e t cam address , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = ( j |CAMWRITE D |
CAMWRITE S |CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k to f i n i s h each wr i t e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
}
// i n s e r t some IP addres se s in t o CAM for t e s t i n g
// Ron ’ s computer ’ s IP address in HEX
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0xa8c02381 ;
// CAM address chosen f o r no reason , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = (25 |CAMWRITE D |
CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k to f i n i s h each wr i t e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
//Mike Mi t z e l ’ s computer
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0xa8c03d81 ;
// CAM address chosen f o r no reason , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = (26 |CAMWRITE D |
CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k
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na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
//my computer ’ s IP
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0xa8c07981 ;
// CAM address chosen f o r no reason , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = (29 |CAMWRITE S |
CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
//dhcp s e r v e r ’ s IP
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0xa8c06981 ;
// CAM address chosen f o r no reason , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = (30 |CAMWRITE D |
CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
// broadcas t packe t s
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0 x f f f f f f f f ;
// CAM address chosen f o r no reason , wr i t e and enab l e
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = (31 |CAMWRITE D |
CAMENABLE) ;
// d i s a b l e c l o c k
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
// s e t CAM pat t e rn to back to zero
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0 ;
// s e t hardware mode
na mode out−>np piodata = 1 ;
// enab l e f i r e w a l l
na enab len p io−>np piodata = 0 ;
na tx reque s t−>np piodata = 0 ;
// p r i n t f (” enab l i ng f i r e w a l l \n”) ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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// s f w i n i t i a l i z e r am
//
// i n i t i a l i z e RAM with ze ros
// a f t e r t e s t i n g t h i s can be done in hardware
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e r am (void )
{
int j ;
// d i s a b l e f i r e w a l l
na enab len p io−>np piodata = 1 ;
// s e t to so f tware mode and t a l k to ram
na mode out−>np piodata = 0 ;
// i n i t i a l i z e the RAM with ze ros in loop
for ( j = 0 ; j < 32 ; j++)
{
// s e t ram data and enab l e
na ram ct l p i o−>np piodata = ( ( j<<5) |RAMWRITE) ;
// f i n i s h ram wr i t e
na ram ct l p i o−>np piodata = 0 ;
}
// s e t hardware mode
na mode out−>np piodata = 1 ;
// enab l e f i r e w a l l
na enab len p io−>np piodata = 0 ;
na tx reque s t−>np piodata = 0 ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s f w t x r e q u e s t
//
// r e qu e s t s acces s to LAN91C111 f o r Nios
void s fw tx r e qu e s t (void )
{
// i f we ’ re in hardware mode , r e que s t the a b i l i t y
// to t ransmi t and do noth ing u n t i l s fw says we can
i f ( na mode in−>np piodata )
{
while ( na tx a l lowed−>np piodata != 1)
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{
na tx reque s t−>np piodata = 1 ;
}
}
// s top t x r e que s t because i t ’ s been answered
// s e t mode to so f tware mode
na tx reque s t−>np piodata = 0 ;
sfw set SW mode ( ) ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s fw get mode
//
// read i f system i s in hardware or so f tware mode
int s fw get mode (void )
{
int r e s u l t ;
r e s u l t = na mode in−>np piodata ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s fw se t mode
//
// s e t system in to hardware or so f tware mode
void s fw set mode ( int mode)
{
na mode out−>np piodata = mode ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s f w i n i t i a l i z e t i m e r
//
// s e t up i n t e r r u p t s e r v i c e rou t ine and
// s t a r t t imer
void s f w i n i t i a l i z e t i m e r (void )
{
int context = 0 ;
// connect the c am f l u s h i s r rou t ine to the t imer i n t e r r u p t
n r i n s t a l l u s e r i s r ( na t imer2 i rq , c am f l u sh i s r ,
context ) ;
// s t a r t the t imer
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na timer2−>np t imercont ro l = 0x0007 ;
}
// +−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// c am f l u s h i s r
//
// i n t e r r u p t s e r v i c e rou t ine f o r
// dynamic removal o f IPs from CAM
void c am f l u s h i s r ( int context )
{
int j , temp , mode ;
// ge t curren t mode
mode = sfw get mode ( ) ;
// i f HW mode , ask to go to SW mode
i f (mode)
s fw tx r e qu e s t ( ) ;
// s e t CAM de l e t e va lue o f 0
na cam pattern−>np piodata = 0 ;
// s e t CAM to read mode and d i s a b l e c l o c k
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
// loop through every RAM address
for ( j = 0 ; j < 32 ; j++)
{
// ge t data va lue at curren t ram address
na ram ct l p i o−>np piodata = j ;
temp = na ram data in−>np piodata ;
// i f curren t RAM data i s 1 ,
// s e t entry to 0 to mark IP address as s t a l e
i f ( temp)
{
// wr i t e 0 to address j
na ram ct l p i o−>np piodata = ( ( j<<5)
|RAMWRITE) ;
na ram ct l p i o−>np piodata = 0 ;
}
else
{
// d e l e t e s t a l e cam entry
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na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = ( j |
CAMWRITE D |CAMENABLE) ;
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata =
CAM DISABLE;
p r i n t f ( ”Deleted entry %d \n” , j ) ;
}
}
// ensure CAM i s in read mode and d i s a b l e c l o c k
na cam ct l p io−>np piodata = CAM DISABLE;
// r e s t o r e prev ious mode
i f (mode)
s fw set mode (mode) ;
// c l e a r t imer i n t e r r u p t
na timer2−>np t imer s ta tus = 0 ;
}
// end o f f i l e
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